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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA SIMS LORD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID GEORGE LORD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 19167 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a judgment distributing 
property in a divorce action instituted by the Respondent, 
Rebecca Sims Lord, on June 22nd, 1981, in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court in and for Washington County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On May 28th, 1982, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
entered judgment after trial granting each party a divorce. 
,Judge Burns reserved judgment, however, pertaining to the 
Jistribution of marital property, as discovery on those 
mdtters was incomplete. 
On January 31, 1983, the Honorable J. Harlan 
Burns, again after trial, entered a Supplemental Decree and 
Judgment pertaining to the distribution of the marital 
l rnperLy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
In Appellant's statement of the relief sought on 
appeal are the following five statements: 
1. The lower Court erred in ruling the Quit 
Claim deed dated October 23, 1977 and filed in 
1979 pertaining to the mar~tal home executed by 
the Plaintiff is a nullity and was wrongfully 
recorded and shall have no effect at law or in 
equity and Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to an 
equitable lien in the amount of $23, 500 against 
the marital home. 
2. The lower Court erred 
Plaintiff/Respondent the sum of 
equitably reimburse her for 
contribution to the business. 
in granting 
$5,023.75 to 
her monetary 
3. The lower Court erred in not granting 
Defendant/ Appellant's Motion for Change of Venue 
after bifurcating the divorce action into a trial 
for divorce and a trial for property settlement. 
4. The · lower Court erred in granting 
Plaintiff/Respondent attorneys [sic] fees in the 
sum of $9,000. 
5. The lower Court erred in not granting 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion for Trial Continuance 
and holding the trial in his absence. (See 
Appellant's Brief, hereinafter AB, at 1-2). ~-
Appellant's points 1, 2 and 4, supra, require the 
Supreme Court to reverse specific findings of fact entered 
by the trial court. Points 3 and 5, supra, request that 
this Court find an abuse as a matter of law for the trial 
court's failure grant a change of venue and continue the 
January 19th, 1983 trial setting. 
The Respondent seeks by her cross-appeal to have 
this Court recognize Appellant's failure to timely perfect 
his appeal. Alternatively, Respondent seeks this Court's 
affirmation of the trial court's decision in this case. 
Beyond the Supreme Court's either declining app0l\dt< 
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Jurisdiction or affirming the trial court, the Respondent 
further seeks a remand for additional attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as Respondent believes Appellant has 
grossly misstated the facts, this statement is necessary, 
pursuant to Rule 75 (p) (2) U.R.C.P. For purposes of clarity, 
Respondent shall categorize the facts as follows: 
A. Status of Record on Appeal 
B. Marital History 
C. Case History 
1. The Mechanics of Discovery 
2. The Marital Horne 
3. Bifurcated Trial 
4. Change of Venue; Motion for Continuance 
5. Trial/Division of Marital Assets; 
Attorney's Fees 
6. Prior Appeals 
7. Status of this Appeal 
D. Final Commentary on Appellant's "Facts" 
A. Status of Record on Appeal 
Respondent normally would not discuss the 
status of the appellate record, but here its paucity becomes 
material to the recitation of facts as hereinafter set 
forth. 
trldl. 
The appeal in this case ensues after plenary 
As such, AppPllant must preserve those portions of 
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the record incident to persuading this Court to reverse the 
trial court's decision. (Point I, infra) Regarding 
exhibits, the Washington County Clerk's notPs indicate that 
at trial Respondent had twenty exli1bi ts marked, identified, 
offered and received into evidence. (See document following 
Minute Entry, hereinafter ME, of January 19, 1983) The 
clerk's index filed with Volume II, hereinafter II, of the 
record indicates that she enclosed the exhibits in an 
Exhibit Envelope at page 182 thereof. Such Exhibit 
Envelope, however, was not part of the record on appeal upon 
receipt by Respondent's counsel. Respondent's counsel has 
further confirmed that even as initially sent to this Court, 
the Exhibit Envelope contained only Exhibits P-1 through 
P-5. P-6 was not included therein, nor were P-8 through 
P-21. Respondent has duplicated some of the exhibits as an 
appendix to this brief, but unavoidably, Respondent only had 
an original of Exhibit P-2. 
The District Court Clerk has 
Respondent's counsel that Exhibits P-8 
sealed by the District Court and that 
further apprised 
through P-21 were 
there has been no 
order or request that that sealed file be opened. 
Beyond the paucity, and indeed total lack of 
exhibits before this Court, citation to the record is 
rendered somewhat difficult because over forty documents in 
the record received no pagination whatsoever. These· 
documents include some correspondence, 
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several notices, orders, dismissals, sanctions, and in fact 
every single minute entry entered by the trial court. 
Lastly, although Appellant filed a certificate 
regarding the transcript of trial, his counsel did not in 
fact order one. (II at 179-80; cf. record on appeal). The 
two transcripts reproduced at Respondent's request were not 
of the trial, and were submitted by Respondent in 1982, 
incident to an earlier appeal filed by the Appellant, No. 
18395. (II at 267-268) 
to pursue a reversal 
Importantly, Appellant has elected 
of the trial court's judgment, and 
indeed to recite his version of facts to this Court, without 
reference to any testimony or evidence heard during trial, 
the same remaining untranscribed. Clearly, absent a full 
complement of exhibits, and sans any trial transcript, 
Appellant can liberally interpret the facts. 
Respondent will attempt to reconstruct the 
Consequently, 
testimony and 
factual setting which guided the trial court in its ruling. 
B. Marital History 
The Respondent, Rebecca Sims, who became 
Rebecca Sims Lord, was a sophomore at Dixie High School in 
St. George when she first met Appellant. At that time, 
Appellant was employed as a narcotics agent, and was on 
assignment in the Washington County area. Rather than 
finding a lead, Appellant became acquainted with his future 
wife, and shortly after her sixteenth birthday, the parties 
w~1e married in Elko, Elko County, Nevada, on January 11th, 
10 7 .!. • (See II at 144, ~l). Immediately after the marriage, 
\'1019/81-3944 5 
Respondent went to work, first at a nursery and then in 
cosmetics. In point of fact, she worked substantially 
full-time throughout the term of her marriage to Appellant. 
(Id., ~ 2) Though Appellant now indicates that his business 
of Accident Investigation and Cause Analysis was established 
in the middle sixties, at trial it was established that the 
Appellant initiated this business in approximately 1974. 
(Id.; cf. AB at 2) In fact, in his initial verified 
counterclaim, Appellant indicates the following: 
That on or about May 5th, 1974, Defendant resigned 
as an employee of the State of Utah and withdrew 
from the State Retirement Fund those monies due 
and owing to him for retirement purposes, and 
established a sole proprietorship business, known 
as Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis. 
Defendant then did hire the Plaintiff to do, but 
not limited to the following: to keep the books, 
to perform secretarial services, to do the 
billings, and etc. (Volume I, hereinafter I, at 
10-11) 
Importantly, this business was primarily operated out of the 
marital home in Sandy, Utah, acquired in approximately 1975. 
(II at 145, V) 
The trial court found that this business was 
capable of generating annual gross revenues in excess of 
$35,000.00. While Rebecca did everything required of her, 
however, whatever remuneration she received was used to pay 
household expenses and supply the other temporal needs of 
the marriage. (:::d. at ~4) 
Though the marriage and business of the parties 
was outwardly a successful one, Rebecca noticed that 
Appellant was inattentive, so that by lg76, he made little 
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time, if ever, for the needs of the marriage. While 
Respondent was willing to accept the axiom that time 
commitments are of ten commensurate with financial success, 
she personally knew little of her husband's outside 
activities, and naively accepted his reasons for being away. 
In this ambient, Appellant's counsel discovered a unique 
marital situation. 
Appellant's counsel describes Mr. Lord as a 
faithful "cuckold", who, though entreating his wife to stay 
with him, nonetheless had to watch her leave him for another 
man in 1982. (AB at 14-15) Appellant's verified answer 
swore to the following: 
position. 
5. That during the course of this marriage the 
Plaintiff separated from the Defendant eleven (11) 
times. That the current separation occurred on 
October 3, 1980. 
6. That on each and every occasion Defendant did 
request and entreat the Plaintiff to return to the 
family home and there co-habit with him as husband 
and wife; that at said time the Defendant offered 
to support and maintain the Plaintiff to the best 
of his ability and to treat her with love and 
affection; that at all said times, the Defendant 
maintained a proper and suitable home and carried 
out his offers and promises. However, on this 
last separation, the Plaintiff refused to accept 
said of fer and promises of the Defendant and 
refused and still refuses, without just cause of 
[sic] excuse to return to the home of the 
Defendant, or to co-habit with him as husband and 
wife. 
7. That since the marriage and during all the 
time that Defendant lived with the Plaintiff, he 
treated her kinctly and affectionately, and has 
conducted himself toward the Plaintiff in a manner 
becoming a good, true and virtuous husband. (I at 
9, emphasis added) 
Appellant has continually maintained this 
Respondent testified, however, that Appellant's 
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apparent revulsion for her fomented the couple's separation, 
and that ultimately, though she hegged him to be faithful to 
the marriagA, he demanded that she leave and muve to St. 
George. And, while she pleaded to be able to return to Salt 
Lake, Appellant repeatedly told her that he did not want any 
kind of a reconciliation or continuation of the marriage. 
Such statements ultimately destroyed all of the Respondent's 
feelings of affection and love for her husband, and any 
desire she might have once had of remaining married to him. 
(I at 183-184) 
Under Utah law, the varying fidelities of the 
parties are normally not to be weighed in allocating the 
marital assets under Title 30. (See, ~· English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977)). As appropriately noted 
during trial, despite receiving some evidence as to the 
varying fidelities of the parties, the trial court placed 
"no weight upon those factors" in dividing the martial 
assets between the parties. (See II at 145, 'l!5). 
Appellant's credibility, however, became subject to question 
by a non-party witness' testimony c.t trial that Appellant 
had formulated a plan of action for the divorce years before 
the kespondent had filed. 
This witness testified that Appellant had tired of 
Respondent by the mid-seventies. Thus, Appellant conceived 
a plan whereby he would force his wife into the arms of 
another man, and by that action seek to both compel the 
divorce and deny his wife, by embarrassment or otherwise, of 
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any part of the marital property. And while Appellant's 
physical needs were being satisfied elsewhere, and 
apparently from multiple sources, he decided that he would 
not touch his wife; so the plain import of these words is 
not lost, Appellant's decision "not to touch" should be 
taken literally. Thus, during the last several years of the 
marriage, not only was the Respondent denied consortium, but 
she was also denied even a casual caress while doing dishes 
with her husband, having her car keys handed to her by him, 
and the other normal forms of physical contact that a 
husband and wife should be able to expect, if not demand 
from each other, in what is supposed to be a unique social 
commitment. 
Respondent, however, though rejected by her 
huscand, knew little about his own physical activities. She 
simply stayed at home and did what he asked her. 
Unfortunately, Appellant's plan had but one major flaw, 
wbich ironically arose from Appellant's own exhibitionism. 
Apparent!:,• confident of his plan's success, he not only 
spoke freely avout the same, but also freely allowed himself 
to be photographed in circumstances suggesting that his 
alleqations of being a virtuous cuckold were, at best, 
exaggerated. 
Courthouse. 
Exhibits 8-20, sealed, Washington County 
In October, 1979, Respondent left the marital home 
in Sandy, Utah, and returned to St. George. Nineteen months 
later, faithful to Appellant's fondest expectations, 
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Respondent strayed from the marriage, and in May of 1~81, 
she began living with Mr. Dennis Rogers, a police officer in 
St. George. One month thereafter, she advised Appellant 
that she would be filing for divorce. At that time 
Appellant threatened her that unless she gave him a divorce 
"on his own terms", that it [her divorce] would be the 
longest divorce on record. (I at 184, 'l!9) 
In May of 1982, at the time of the initial divorce 
decree, which reserved for plenary hearing the issues 
pertaining to property division, the Respondent was four 
months pregnant. The trial court appropriately subdued the 
foregoing tainted history with the following two findings: 
3. Defendant has treated Plaintiff cruelly, 
causing her great mental distress and suffering, 
and has during the period of the marriage refused 
affection, conversation and association with her 
in a husband-wife relationship. 
4. Plaintiff has committed adultery during the 
course of this marriage, and more particularly, in 
May of 1981, commenced cohabiting with a male 
person other than her husband, and on the date of 
hearing was four months pregnant with his unborn 
child. (I at 263) 
C. Case History 
Respondent testified that Appellant 
threatened her in May of 1981 that this would become the 
longest divorce case in the history of the State of Utah. 
(I at 184, 'l!9) The following subcategories will hopefully 
clarify the rather arduous catacombs from which this appeal 
has so belatedly emerged. 
W019/81-3944 10 
1. The Mechanics of Discovery 
The Appellant's discovery requests and 
Rebecca Lord's responses thereto proceeded in the following 
orderly manner: Appellant's first set of interrogatories 
was filed on August 10th, 1981, and answered by Respondent 
on September 16th, 1984. (I at 20, 61) His request for 
admissions was filed similarly on August 10th, 1981, with 
Rebecca's response being filed on September 11th, 1981. (I 
at 16, 42) A second set of interrogatories filed by the 
Appellant on August 17th, 1981, were responded to by answers 
filed on the 16th of September, 1981. (I at 41, 66) 
The Respondent's propounded discovery, however, 
proceeded in a somewhat less than orderly manner, as the 
following, inter alia, exemplifies. In her initial 
complaint, Rebecca requested reimbursement of monies she 
received from her grandmother's (Helen Sims Laub) estate, 
which Rebecca had advanced to the family business. She also 
requested an equitable division of both the business and the 
marital home in Sandy. Through her counsel, she filed both 
requests for the production of documents and interrogatories 
on the 12th of August, 1981. (I at 20, 23) Thirteen months 
later, after several motions and objections, the District 
Court finally ordered the Appellant to answer on or before 
the 25th of September, 1982, each and every interrogatory 
"submitted by the Plaintiff and filed with the Court on the 
12th of August, 1981." (II at 76, '1[2) The Judge further 
ordered that less and excepting bank statements and 
ccencelled checks for the bank accounts from 1973 through 
W0l9/81-3944 11 
1980, that the request for production of documents filed 
with the Court on August 12th, 1981, be complied with on or 
before the 25th of September, 1982. (II at 76-77, <1{3) The 
convoluted path which led to this discovery order is 
extraordinary. 
~ 
L • The Marital Home 
In Paragraph 5 of her complaint for divorce, 
Mrs. Lord alleged that the parties had acquired a marital 
home located at 8950 Alpen Way in Sandy, Utah. (I at 1) In 
Paragraph 2 of her prayer, she requested that the home be 
sold and that the proceeds be divided equally. (Id., at 3) 
The Appellant, however, filed a verified answer and 
counterclaim, and over his oath swore to the following 
scenario: 
That the Plaintiff and Defendant did on or about 
October 23, 1977, execute a Quit-Claim Deed and 
agreement whereby the Plaintiff in consideration 
of the payment to her of a sum of $10.00 and other 
valuable consideration, e.g., a 1977 Toyota Celica 
of the value of $9, 000. 00, registered and titled 
in her name, promised and agreed to accept said 
car in tull settlement, payment, and discharge of 
any and all equitable and legal interest in the 
marital home acquired during the course of the 
marriage located at 8950 Al pen Way, Sandy, Utah, 
84121, more specifically known as 'All of Lot 9, 
GOLDEN HILLS NUMBER 14'; that said Quit-Claim Deed 
having been duly recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder and the agreement having been 
fully performed and executed by each o! the 
parties thereto, and Defendant has fully complied 
therewith by conveying to Plaintiff, one (1) 1977 
Toyota Celica, VIN RA29130025, with clear title to 
the Plaintiff. A copy of said Quit-Claim Deed is 
marked "Exhibit A" and by this reference made a 
part hereof. (I at 10, <l{l/) 
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Appellant's exhibit "A" appears for the first time 
in the record attached to his verified answer and 
counterclaim. (I at 19) Introduced at trial as Exhibit 
P-1, the Quit-Claim Deed shows that it was executed on the 
23rd of October, 1977 by the Respondent, her signature being 
notarized by Mr. Anthony Thurber, an attorney in Salt Lake 
City. The deed further reflects its recordation a year and 
a half later in March of 1979. 
On appeal, the Appellant again sets forth the 
scenario to this Court as follows: 
In October of 1977, Defendant realized that 
eventually the marriage would end in divorce 
regardless of his efforts to keep the marriage 
together. Defendant knew that if the marriage did 
culminate in divorce that Plaintiff would return 
to her hometown in St. George, Utah leaving their 
marital home which was located at 8950 Alpen Way, 
Sandy, Utah. It was Defendant's desire to retain 
the marital home and therefore proposed [sic] to 
Plaintiff that he would buy her half interest in 
the home if she would sell it to him. Plaintiff 
agreed and a bargain was struck that in return for 
her one-half interest in the marital home the 
Defendant would purchase a brand-new 1977 Toyota 
Celica automobile valued at $9, 000. 00 in return 
for that half interest. The $9, 000. 00 exceeded 
Plaintiff's one-half equity interest in the 
marital home. Defendant purchased the 1977 
automobile and paid all monies out of his own 
pocket and gave Plaintiff the title free and clear 
to the automobile. (AB at 3) 
In reciting the above, Appellant's only citation 
provided this Court is the installment sale and security 
agreement and certificate of title to a 1977 Toyota. (Id.) 
Although the copy of these documents has been marked 11/23 
in two inappropriate places, it is clear that the original 
security cigreement WA.s signed on October 7th, 1977. (See 
W019/81-3944 13 
lower left-hand column of installment sale and security 
agreement, I at 141). Thus, though Utah issued title on 
December 5th, 1977, Respondent had then owned the car for 
almost a month. These documents further show that the 
vehicle was purchased on October 7th, 1977, more than two 
weeks prior to the execution of the deed by Respondent. (I 
at 141; cf. I at 19). Respondent, Mrs. Lord, was shocked at 
discovering in 1981 that the deed still existed, and 
moreover that it had been recorded. She testified that in 
late October of 1977, she and her husband had been recently 
separated, and that she was pleading with him to remain 
married. Further, that as a condition to remaining 
together, he required her to execute a Quit-Claim Deed to 
the marital home which would not be recorded. Then, if the 
parties remained together for at least one year, the deed 
would be destroyed. Only with this agreement in mind had 
she executed the deed. Mr. Lord later told her that he had 
destroyed it. As for the Toyota, this had been simply 
purchased for her use. 
Before the trial court, Appellant held tight to 
his scenario of the facts, as Respondent did to hers. The 
burden remained with the Respondent, however, to both set 
aside the deed and to establish the value of the marital 
home. Regarding the former issue, she had but one clear 
hope. At the time of executing the deed, the parties had 
requested a mutual family friend, Mr. Anthony Thurber to 
notarize Mrs. Lord's signature. In Mr. Thurber's presence, 
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this agreement had been gone over in great detail. The 
latter issue, that is, of value, could be easily determined 
by a competent appraiser. Appellant strenuously sought to 
prevent the trial court from discovering the truth as to 
either matter. 
appeal: 
Appellant recites the following in his brief on 
On the 13th day of October, 1981, Defendant and 
counsel were in St. George for the aforementioned 
hearings [including entry on land]. While walking 
toward the courthouse in St. George, the Defendant 
was stopped by the Plaintiff, who stated that it 
had never been her desire to pursue the divorce 
this far and just [sic] wanted to get out of the 
marriage. Defendant told Plaintiff to go back and 
tell her counsel this. Which she did and the 
aforementioned hearing scheduled for October 13th 
and 14th, 1981 were continued without date by 
stipulation of the parties. (AB at 6) 
In point of fact, the foregoing totally misstates 
what occurred in October of 1981. The hearing initially 
arose because on September 28th, 1981, Appellant, attaching 
a copy of the aforementioned Quit-Claim Deed, objected to 
Plaintiff's request for entry on the land, filed on 
September 16th, 1981. (I at 89-91; cf. 68). When it became 
clear that entry upon the land would be resisted, 
Respondent's counsel moved for an order allowing entry on 
the land on October 1, 1981. (I at 110-11) 
While Appellant correctly recites that the October 
14th motions were continued without date, his reasons 
therefor are totally incorrect. (AB at 6) On October 13, 
Jq81, both parties and counsel met at the noon break at the 
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Elks Club in St. George, Utah. Also present at this meeting 
was Mr. Dennis Rogers. The marital home was discussed, and 
the thrust of Respondent's evidence, including her shock 
that the Quit-Claim Deed had been wrongfully recorded, were 
expressed. Appellant and his counsel then agreed that 
Respondent's appraiser could enter upon the land without 
objection so that a value on the marital home could be 
established. This agreement pending, Respondent's counsel 
indicated that the hearing could be continued. 
Incident to a prior appeal, No. 18395, 
Respondent's counsel requested a transcript of those October 
proceedings, wherein Respondent's counsel recited the 
following: 
The Court: Mr. Hughes, I set your matter at the 
end of the calendar. 
Mr. Hughes: I think I may have some good news for 
the Court. 
The Court: You have settled it? 
Mr. Hughes: I'd like to say that, but I can't. 
But I can state this; the parties met with 
counsel, at it is proposed, at the present, that 
our appraiser will be allowed access to the home. 
The Defendant will also obtain an appraiser, in an 
attempt for them to come to an agreement on the 
value cf the home: and they're also attempting to 
agree on the value of the Plaintiff's contribution 
to the accident reconstruction business. And as 
part of those settlement negotiations, we have 
agreed, both counsel, to continue all of the 
motions without notice at the present time, with 
the exception that tacitly my motion for entry on 
the land has been granted by stipulation to grant 
our appraiser access. He will contact the 
Defendant in order to make arrangements on that 
time. And that's the substance of where we're at, 
(R 267 at 2) 
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Subsequent to the October, 1981 meeting, Appellant 
refused the requests of Mr. Peter Poulsen, 
Respondent's cippraiser, to enter the marital home and 
appraise it. As a result, a second motion to compel entry 
on the land, following the earlier request and earlier 
motion, was filed on Februu.ry 1, 1982 by Respondent. (I at 
123-24) Appellant again actively objected to the entry on 
the land, filing a "countermotion" thereto on the 8th day of 
February. (I at 127) In support thereof, Appellant filed 
an affidavit relying once again on his theory that the 
Quit-Claim Deed had been executed and recorded in exchange 
for the 1977 Toyota Celica, thus divesting Respondent of any 
interest in the home. (I at 129-131) 
On February 16th, 1982, the District Court Judge 
ordered that the Plaintiff's appraiser be allowed to enter 
the marital home on Saturday, February 27th, 1982, at the 
hour of 9: 00 a .m. (I at 132-33) Only two days before the 
appraiser was to go upon the property, Appellant, allegedly 
pursuant to Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
filed an objection to the district court's order compelling 
en tr~.'. (I at 134-35) Absent a hearing on that objection, 
entry by Mr. Poulsen was once again denied by the Appellant. 
Thereafter, Respondent's counsel filed a motion for 
sanctions under Rule 37 U.R.C.P., together with a supporting 
affidavit. (I at 143-46) Respondent further replied to 
AppPl lant' s "Rule 46" objection and additionally filed an 
in1t1al motion for an order to show cause to find Appellant 
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in contempt. (I at 147; 149-50) The motion for sanctions, 
pursuant to Rules 37(b) (2) (B) and (C) U.R.<.P. was heard by 
the district court and resulted in the following sanction, 
from which there has been no appeal: 
AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE [several findings], IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant shall hereinafter 
not be allowed to oppose Plaintiff's vested 
interest in one-half of the equity in the home 
located at 8950 Alpen Way in Sandy, Utah, on the 
basis of a Quit-Claim Deed dated October of 1977 
and recorded eighteen months later without 
Plaintiff's consent or by other means; further, 
that Plaintiff's appraiser's evaluation of the 
home, when obtained, shall, upon proper 
foundation, be conclusive as to the value of the 
home. (I at 158-60) 
The above sanctions, nonetheless, still required 
the entry of Respondent's appraiser on the land. Yet 
another motion to compel this entry was filed on April 1st, 
1982, together with an affidavit in support thereof. (I at 
164-67) On April 13th, 1982, the trial court once again 
ordered that the appraiser be allowed entry on the marital 
home, and further requested that the order be served upon 
Appellant as by personal service. (ME 4-13-82) A formal 
order compelling entry on the land was executed on the 16th 
day of April, 1982, by Judge J. Harlan Burns, but not 
in®ediately filed of record, by reason of an "appeal", filed 
by Appellant on April 9th, 1982. (I at 174; cf. II at 
34-35, '!I's 8 and 37). This inefficacious "appeal" from an 
interlocutory order was summarily dismissed by this Court 
for lack of jurisdiction on June 6th, 1982. (I at 268) 
Finally, on September 22nd, 1982, the District Court Judge 
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once again made the following findings and order with 
respect to the marital home: 
1. That an original order compelling entry 
on land was executed by Judge J. Harlan Burns, 
sitting as District Judge, and filed in the court 
records on February 16th, 1982. 
2. That the order required the Defendant to 
allow Plaintiff's appraiser, Peter Poulsen, to 
enter onto the real property and the parties' 
former residence at 8950 Alpen Way in Sandy, Utah, 
on Saturday, February 27th, 1982, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m. for the purpose of making an appraisal 
of the value of said real property and 
improve!l'ents. 
3. That contact was made by the apprai8er, 
but that the Defendant refused the appraiser 
access on such property, which refusal was 
confirmed by an affidavit filed by Defendant's 
attorney on March 8th, 1982, in the official court 
records, which indicated that Mr. Lord had 
instructed the appraiser that the discovery order 
"was in limbo and Mr. Poulsen could not enter on 
to the property." 
4. The Court finds that on March 8th, 1982, 
when said affidavit was filed, an appeal had in 
fact not been taken to the Supreme Court, and the 
discovery order was then extant. 
5. The Court finds that the affidavit filed 
on March 8th, 1982, is directly contrary to 
paragraph 10 of the counteraffidavit of Daniel A. 
Stanton, filed in September of this year (1982], 
which paragraph indicates that the Defendant did 
not refuse to allow Plaintiff or her agent to 
enter onto the property, exce~t other than while 
the matter was up on appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
6. The Court finds that March 15th, 1982, 
Maurice D. Jones, sitting as District Court Judge 
pro tern, did sanction the Defendant for failure to 
comply with the earlier order of the district 
court, and that further, Judge Jones, for good 
cause, did indicate the Defendant's objection to 
the order granting entry was without merit. 
7. The Court further finds that the 
Plaintiff's interest in the property is vested by 
reason of the order of Maurice Jones filed in the 
District Court on March 15th, 1982, and that such 
matter is not appealable to another district court 
judge . . 
Upon review of the above, the Court hereby 
orders as follows: 
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1. That the Plaintiff's appraiser be 
allowed to appraise the property located at 8950 
Al pen Way, Sandy, Utah, on Tuesday, the 21st of 
September at 8:00 or 9:00 a.m., at the appraiser's 
choice, and that the appraiser need notify no 
other party regarding that choice, other than the 
offices of Daniel Stanton, by leaving a message 
therewith with Mr. Stanton individually, or his 
secretary. The appraiser's access to the property 
shall be unfettered by the Defendant, and 
unhindered by him or his agents. He shal 1 be 
allowed free and full access to the same until the 
appraiser is satisfied that he has had an adequate 
and full opportunity to examine premises and to 
make his independent appraisal, which shall be 
without the benefit of input from the Defendant or 
the Defendant's agents. (II at 34-36) 
Despite this order, in September of 1982, 
Appellant once again denied Mr. Paulsen's entry on the land. 
(II at 42-45, ~·s 13-25) Respondent then moved for an order 
to show cause in re contempt. (II at 63-73) On the 30th of 
September the Hon. J. Harlan Burns issued an order to show 
cause which was served upon Appellant on the 8th of October, 
1982. (II at 81-83) Later, the district court found 
Appellant in contempt. (ME 10-(12-13)-82) The formal 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and sentence re 
contempt were not executed and filed by the court until 
January 19th, 1983. (II at 131-38) The conuni tment was 
ordered filed unsigned. (II at 139) Previous thereto, 
pending Appellant's appropriate response to the 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents 
filed fifteen months previous thereto, the order of contempt 
had been stayed. (II at 94-95) 
Finally, on January 4th, 1983, Appellant was 
requested to admit that the marital home had a fair market 
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value of $qs,ooo.oo. (II at 117-18) By simultaneous 
motion, the time for responding to this request for 
,1dmission was ordered shortened to January 15th, 1983, and 
lhis order telegraphically communicated to Appellant's 
counsel. (II at 119-22; 127-28; see also Affidavit of 
Shelley L. Nelson, filed January 12th, 1983). 
This request for admission was never answered, 
though the appraisal of Peter Poulsen, ultimately obtained, 
was entered as Exhibit P-3. A photograph of a portion of 
the home still exists in the record. (I at 44) 
In an early effort to sustain his scenario 
concerning the viability of the October 23, 1977, Quit-Claim 
Deed, Appellant claimed that any agreement recited by the 
parties in Mr. Thurber's presence was privileged and 
precluded Mr. Thurber's testimony, despite the fact that on 
the occasion in question, Mr. Thurber had acted without 
charge, solely as a notary, and as a family friend to both 
parties. (I at 117, !5) Apparently, on the 4th of January, 
1983, Appellant's counsel and Mr. Thurber spoke regarding 
the latter's testimony. In a letter dated January 4th, 
1983, marked and received as Exhibit P-4, Appellant's 
counsel restates the conversation with Mr. Thurber thusly: 
You [Mr. Thurber] acknowledged that Mr. Lord did 
in fact give an automobile to the Plaintiff in 
exchange for a Quit Claim Deed to the home. That 
transaction is now in dispute and is to be among 
other items the subject matter of your testimony. 
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Mr. Thurber, in turn, respundcc,C with il 1P1ter on 
January 11th, 1981, which w.1s lf'("•'lV<ro .<:•; f:xh1iiit ['-~, and 
replied as follows: 
This letter is 
correcting certain 
in your letter of 
the above. 
written for the purpose of 
misstatements of fact appearing 
January 4th, 1983, concerning 
As I indicated to you most clearly in that 
conversation, the quit claim deed in question was 
executed and delivered to David by Rebecca Lord in 
my presence on the express condition that it would 
be held unrecorded for a period of one year, and 
if the two remained together as husband and wife 
at the end of that period of time the deed would 
be destroyed. The statement appearing on the 
first page of your letter, "You acknowledged that 
1-:r. Lord did in fact give an automobile to the 
Plaintiff in exchange for a Quit Claim Deed to the 
home", is entirely untrue. There was a witness to 
the conversation of January 4th, 1983, who is 
prepared to confirm that fact if necessary. 
My involvement with the execution of the deed 
was only as a notary. The deed had been prepared 
previously. There was no attorney/client 
relationship existing between either party to the 
deed and myself at the time of execution . 
As both letters have been misplaced on the record on appeal, 
they are reproduced as an appendix to this brief. 
Respondent subpoenaed ~r. Thurber for trial. He 
appeared on January 19th, 1983, pursuant to that subpoena. 
Appellant's counsel recites the following: 
On the afternoon of January 18th, 1983, Anthony 
Thurber, attorney at law and witness for the 
Plaintiff, cal led Defendant's lawyer's office and 
stated that he heard an appeal had been made and 
wanted to know if it was true. On affirmation he 
stated that it should stop the trial scheduled for 
the next day and therefore he woulcl not appe;n 1 '' 
St. George. (AB at 8) 
On the 18th of ,!anuary there was no appeal filed 
in this case. Furthermore, Mr. Thurber, by i1li ,1 ff idavi t 
W019/81-3944 
pr0viously submitted to this Court, stated the following as 
tu his conversation on the 18th day of January, 1983: 
4. I have reviewed the affidavit of Daniel 
A. Stanton, subscribed and sworn to on the 3 lst 
day of May, 1983, and filed with this court. 
Paragraph 13 of Mr. Stanton's affidavit states the 
following: 'On January 18th, 1983, witness for 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Anthony Thurber, attorney at 
law, called our office and asked about the appeal 
that was processed to the Supreme Court on the 
court's order denying Defendant-Appellant's motion 
for change of venue. Upon the affirmative answer 
from Affiant that the District Court had processed 
the appeal, Anthony Thurber then stated that he 
would not appear for trial the following day 
because he felt the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to continue with the trial until the 
appeal was resolved by the Utah Supreme Court.' 
5. The above paragraph 13 of Mr. Stanton's 
affidavit is not true. 
6. On the 18th day of January, 1983, I 
spoke with Mr. Stanton over the telephone and 
indicated to him that I was under subpoena to 
appear in the District Court in and for Washington 
County in the case of Lord v. Lord, Civil No. 
8042. I advised Mr. Stanton that as I was under 
subpoena I was going down to testify as to the 
invalidity of the deed attached hereto as Exhibit 
A, and I suggested to Mr. Stanton that he settle 
his lawsuit on the best terms possible for his 
client. Mr. Stanton told me that he intended to 
appeal, and that he, Mr. Stanton, was not going to 
attend the trial. At no time did I tell Mr. 
Stanton that I would not appear for trial on the 
19th day of January, and at no time did I advise 
Mr. Stanton that I felt the trial court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the matter set before it 
on the 19th day of January. 
7. On the 19th day of January, under 
subpoena, I was sworn and, upon being ordered to 
testify by the Court, did so pursuant to the 
questioning of Michael D. Hughes, attorney for the 
Plaintiff and Respondent herein, Rebecca Sims 
Lord. (Appendix, emphasis added) 
As stated, Appellant has reconstructed a statement of facts 
trom unknown conversations between the parties and phone 
calls with non-party witnesses, unrelated to the record, and 
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untranscribed before this Court. As a result, and solely to 
correct the record, extraneous materials have been referred 
to in order to rectify what Resp0nclent' s cuuns<-'l believes 
are blatant misstatements to this Court. A recitation of 
facts for purposes of appeal should normally strictly adhere 
to the record on appeal, and after plenary trial, of course, 
to a transcript of the trial proceedings. The trial court 
handling the issue of the validity of the Quit-Claim Deed, 
having reviewed the records pertaining to discovery, and 
after ordering Mr. Thurber to testify as to those 
conversations held between the parties and in Mr. Thurber's 
presence, made the following findings of fact after plenary 
trial: 
6. That on the 23rd day of October, 1977, 
the Plaintiff executed a Quit-Claim Deed to the 
Defendant, but that the Plaintiff had by such deed 
no immediate intent to transfer property or to 
irrevocably deliver the deed to the Defendant for 
recording. 
7. That in fact such deed on the basis of 
the overwhelming evidence offered was not to be 
recorded and was to be destroyed if the parties 
remained together as husband and wife within one 
year after the date of its execution. 
8. That such deed was wrongfully filed 
contrary to the agreement of the parties in March 
of 1979, but that such deed as filed is a nullity. 
9. That the Plaintiff has been required, in 
overcoming the Defendant's position that such deed 
conveyed away her interest in the marital home, to 
subpoena witnesses and to retain the services of 
an attorney. 
10. That in pursuing this matter generally 
before the Court, Plaintiff was required to retain 
the services of an attorney, and has been placed 
in a position by Defendant which eyuitab 1 ' 
requires some offset of the Plaintift's legal 
expenses. 
11. That the proceedings in this case have 
been lengthy, invol,,ing or.e prior appeal which 
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Respondent 
dismissed [sic] summarily by the Supreme Court and 
several motions which have been heard before 
several judges sitting pro tern, or by appropriate 
juct:cial appointment. 
12. That an appropriate evidentiary basis 
for attorney's fees was provided before the 
District Court, indicating that as of the date of 
trial the Plaintiff's fees were approaching the 
sum of $13,000.00, that testimony was offered 
which might otherwise support an award in excess 
of that amount. 
13. That the Plaintiff was an heir to Helen 
Sims Laub, whose estate was probated during the 
marriage, and that the Plaintiff advanced to 
Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, 
primarily to offset back taxes of that business 
and other economic reversals suffered by the 
p2rties, the sum of $5,023.75, received directly 
from her inheritance by checks received from the 
executor of the Helen Sims Laub estate, and that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to an equitable return 
of that money invested on the basis of the court's 
ruling as later set forth herein from the joint 
property and other assets of the marriage. (II at 
146-47) 
3. Bifurcated Trial 
Eleven months after filing her complaint, 
had still not obtained her discovery. 
Nonetheless, by reason of statements from both Respondent 
and Appellant's counsel, the trial court found there was no 
chance of reconciling the marriage, and took jurisdiction to 
grant both parties a divorce, reserving issues as to the 
real and personal property, responsibility of debts and 
ohligations and attorney's fees for a later hearing. (I at 
762-66) 
Between this cursory hearing held to award each 
1 ctrty a divorce, and the final hearing in which property 
J1v1sion and attorney's fees were resolved, two major 
rr.atters came before the trial court. One involved 
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Appellant's requested change of venue, and the lattPr his 
belated request for a continuancp of thC' suhsPquPnt trial 
setting. 
4. Change of Venue; Motion for Continuance 
Appellant filed his motion for change of 
venue on October 20th, 1982, approximately sixteen months 
after Respondent's initial complaint and 
verified answer and counterclaim had been filed. 
Appellant's 
(II at 87; 
cf. I at 1, 7) The trial court heard Appellant's motion as 
requested by Appellant on October 21, 1982. (See 
Appellant's notice of hearing filed October 20, 1982). 
Appellant's untimely motion was denied. (See Appellant's 
"Protective Notice of Appeal", filed January 4th, 1983). A 
"protective notice of appeal" presumably a notice of 
intention to preserve the right to appeal pursuant to Rule 
72(a), U.R.C.P. was filed by Appellant on January 4th, 1983. 
A formal order prepared by Appellant denying a change of 
venue was filed by the trial court on the 11th day of 
January, 1983. (II at 125) 
On October 25, 1982, shortly after the motion to 
change venue had been filed, the trial court sent notice of 
a pretrial hearing to be scheduled on January 19th, 1983. 
(See Notice of Pretrial Hearing filed October 25, 1982). On 
November 2, 1982, the trial court vacated the pretrial 
hearing, and noticed a non jury trial ten weeks later OJ, 
January 19th, 1983. (See notice filed November 2, 1982). 
On the morning of trial, to-wit, January 19th, 1983, with 
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the Respondent present and two witnesses having been 
subpoenaed from Salt Lake at great expense to her, Appellant 
mcved for a continuance of the trial setting. Concurrently, 
Appellant attempt Pd to divest the trial court of 
Jurisdiction by filing a direct appeal pursuant to Rule 
73(a) U.R.C.P. from the order denying change of venue. 
Neither Respondent nor Respondent's counsel had been advised 
of either of these actions. Insofar as Appellant had not 
sought appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 72(b) 
U.R.C.P., and had not properly deposited copies of a 
petition for an interlocutory appeal with the Supreme Court 
pursuant to that rule, the trial court denied the belated 
motion for continuance, entering the following findings of 
fact: 
1. That the trial set for the 19th day of 
January, 1983, is the second half of a bifurcated 
trial, the first portion of which was tried in 
1982. 
2. That the notice of trial was duly sent 
by the clerk of the court to all parties, and that 
the Plaintiff, at some expenses, has appeared with 
her witnesses and counsel, prepared and ready to 
go forward. · 
3. That the basis for a continuance, based 
on the allegation of improper venue is not 
well-taken, insofar as the motion to change venue 
was not presented timely, pursuant to Rule 12 (b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and such 
objection, if any, was waived, and jurisdiction is 
properly vested in this court, pursuant to Title 
30 of the Utah Code. 
4. That this court's earlier order denying 
venue is interlocutory in nature, and that no 
appeal lies therefrom, but that the relative 
merits of Defendant's position, if any, regarding 
improper venue may be preserved on appeal from the 
final disposition of this case See Schram-Johnson 
Drugs v. Cox, 79 Utah 276, 9 P.2d 399. 
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The Court finds, therefore, that the d0nial 
of venue, being interlocutory in nature, gives 
rise only to a petition for interlocutory ilppeal 
or, if such motion were tu have heen made 
promptly, a potential extr,wtclLndty 1vr1t as set 
forth in the case ,,f Angell v. The Sixth Judicial 
District Court, No. 18651, decided October 4, 
1982. As the motion for continuanre is posited 
primarily about a potential appeal from this 
order, which is not uppealable prior to trial, it 
is not well-taken, being filed untimely and not 
telephonically communicated to Plaintiff's 
counsel. Further, as there is no allegation that 
the Defendant or his attorney was otherwise 
unavailable for purposes of trial, the Court in 
its discretion hereby denies the verified motion 
for continuance. (II at 140-42) 
Pursuant to Rule 5 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial judge noted the filing date of his 
order as January 19th, 1983. (II at 140) 
S. Trial/Division of Marital Assets Pursuant to 
Title 30; Attorney's Fees 
At the trial on January 19th, 1983, the 
judge, placing no weight upon the varying fidelities of the 
parties to the marriage, divided the marital assets in the 
following manner. (II at 145, '][5) 
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A. Respondent was awarded, on the basis of 
Exhibit P-2 and her oral testimony, the 
return of $5,023.75 "advanced to Accident 
Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, primarily 
to offset back taxes of that business " 
The court considered this to be an equitable 
return of her money invested in that family 
business. She was not, however, awarded any 
continuing interest in the business 
whatsoever. (II at 147, '][13; 148, 'l119) The 
court further awarded the Respondent the 1977 
Toyota Celica hatchback, which had been Mrs. 
Lord's since October 7, 1977. (II at 147, 
<J[l6; I at 141) On the date of trial, th•_ 
court further found that the mar it <1 l hc·n:e h.1ri 
an equity of $47,000.00 thereto, and that th' 
wife was entitled to half of that equ1t\', 
to-wit the sum of $23,500.00. (JI at 148, 
28 
<[17) She was also awarded a desk owned by 
her prior to the marriage, a washer and 
dryer, her personal fishing equipment, 
yearbooks, and other personal belongings 
which were still in the marital home. Though 
ordered to be delivered forthwith to the 
Plaintiff, no such delivery has taken place. 
(II at 148, '1[19) 
B. Appellant was awarded any and all 
interest in the business known as Accident 
Feconstruction and Cause Analysis found to be 
capable of generating in excess of $35,000.00 
per annum, subject only to the repayment of 
those monies advanced to the business by the 
Respondent. (II at 145, '1[4; 148, '1[19; cf. 
147, 'l[l3). Furthermore, Appellant was 
awarded the remaining equity, to-wit, 
$23,500.00, in the marital home. (II at 148, 
'l[l9; cf. 147-48, <[17). The court further 
found that Appellant was entitled to the TV 
and VCR equipment, the camping equipment, the 
guns, various appliances, camera and stereo 
equipment, the Toyota Land Cruiser, and the 
Toyota Supra, subject to whatever debts were 
then owed on that personal property. With 
regard to the marital home, the court 
judiciously found that though the Appellant 
was the only one making payments thereon, he 
had had for over two years at the time of 
trial, exclusive beneficial use thereof. (II 
at 148-49, '1[21) 
Regarding attorney's fees, Respondent's counsel 
testified to an attorney's fee in an amount of $12,500.00 as 
of the date of trial. A second witness, Mr. Philip L. 
Foremaster, Esq., was also sworn, and testified on 
examination by Respondent's counsel as to an appropriate 
attorney's fee. (ME 1-19-83) 
The court then entered three separate findings 
µert01ning to the validity of the October 23, 1977, 
Uui t-Clairn Deed. Thereafter, four findings were set forth 
by the court which in the trial judge's opinion equitably 
compelled an award of attorney's fees, though substantially 
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less than that testified to on the Respondent's behalf. (II 
at 146-47, ~·s 9-12; 148 ~18) 
6. Prior Appeals 
Appellant's brief was originally labeled for 
Case No. 18395. Indeed, that was one of two prior "direct" 
appeals improperly brought before the Supreme Court by 
Appellant. As previously mentioned, there is no trial 
transcript; the two transcripts which are 
submitted by Respondent as being pertinent 
appeal. 
produced were 
to that first 
In his first appeal, Appellant sought to appeal a 
discovery sanction, as if the same were a final order. The 
notice of appeal is filed on April 9th, 1982. (I at 174) 
The appeal was deemed filed by the Supreme Court on April 
22nd, 1982, and was given the number 18395. (I at 180) 
Respondent's motion to 
appeal, pursuant to Rule 73B(a) (2) 
summarily dismiss the 
and (e), together with a 
memorandum in support thereof, were appropriately mailed to 
the Supreme Court on the 6th day of May, 1982. (I at 222-40) 
Respondent's motion for summary dismissal was 
denied; however, this Court dismissed appeal No. 18395 on 
its own motion on the grounds "that the order appealed from 
[was] not a final judgment, and this court 
[lacked] jurisdiction." (I at 168) 
A second "direct" appeal f rorn a concededly 
interlocutory order was ineffectively taken immediately 
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atter trial on January 19th, 1983. On March 23, 1983, the 
Utah Supreme Court again dismissed this appeal, No. 18959, 
as the same was from an interlocutory order. The Supreme 
Court, in dismissing this second appeal, noted the following 
precedent in Utah law: 
There is no direct appeal in this jurisdiction 
from an order granting or refusing a change of 
venue. See Hale v. Barker, 70 Utah 284, 259 P. 
928 (1927). (See order of dismissal immediately 
preceding II at 178). 
7. Status of this Appeal 
The facts regarding the status of this third 
and last appeal will be recited under the heading "Cross 
Appeal" i;1 this brief. As a matter of law, Appellant has 
failed to timely perfect this appeal to the Supreme Court. 
This last defect is jurisdictional. 
D. Final Commentary on Appellant's "Facts" 
Appellant's counsel relates that Respondent's 
counsel stipulated to the continuance of a September 9, 1981 
discovery hearing, and that such discussion was memorialized 
by let'~er. (AB at 4-5) Appellant cites his letter at I at 
75 as supportive of his allegations. (AB at 4-5) 
Appellant's brief then relates that Respondent's counsel 
went ahead with the hearing despite this earlier 
stipulation. 
In September of 1981, Respondent's counsel had 
;nucticed before the Fifth Judicial District in and for 
Wushington County for approximately six and one-half years. 
At that point in time the District Court Judge, by reason of 
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his extended duties in at least four other counties, only 
came to St. George for one week a month. As ci practical 
matter, there was no such thing as " two-week continuance. 
As a result, when Appellant's counsel's secretary requested 
a continuance, Respondent's counsel replied he would 
stipulate to one for two days, but would not consent to a 
two-week continuance, because as a practical matter, two 
weeks meant one month. Knowing this, nine days before 
Appellant's counsel's self-serving letter dated September 
17th, 1981, he drafted a formal motion of continuance, filed 
on September 14th, 1981. (I at 51) Had Respondent's 
counsel stipulated on September 4, 1981, to continue the 
hearing two weeks, such a formal motion for continuance 
would not have been subsequently required. 
In an affidavit in support of that motion for 
continuance, Appellant's counsel states that Respondent's 
counsel "agreed to a two-day, but no more than two-week 
continuance." (I at 52, 'l!6) As set forth in Respondent's 
counsel's affidavit prepared and filed on the 16th of 
September, 1981, the following represents those facts which 
the trial court accepted in denying Appellant's first of 
many motions for a continuance: 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice 
law in the State of Utah and am counsPl of record 
for the Plaintiff Rebecca Sims Lord in the 
above-entitled action. 
2. This affidavit is based upon personal 
knowledge. 
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3. That some time after September 1, 1981, 
Affiant did h0ve a conversation with the secretary 
of Daniel A. Stanton, who initially requested a 
two-day continuance of the order to show cause 
hearing, to which two-day continuance Affiant 
agreed. 
4. That subsequent thereto, 
contacted by Daniel A. Stanton, 
requesting a one-month continuance 
Affiant negatively replied. 
Affiant was 
said Stanton 
to which the 
5. That Affiant then advised Stanton that 
he should be prepared to go forward on the morning 
of the hearing, and indicated in the alternative, 
to Stanton being able to appear on behalf of his 
client, that several other counsel were available 
in the area . (I at 55) 
Respondent's statement of facts, though lengthy, 
in its entirety was again deemed necessary pursuant to Rule 
75(p) (2), U.R.C.P. 
POINT I 
THE RECORD CERTIFIED FOR APPEAL PRECLUDES THE SUPREME COURT 
FROM REALISTICALLY REVIEWING THIS CASE AND DOES NOT ENABLE 
THE SUPREME COURT TO ACCURATELY REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT 
PROCEEDINGS WITH THE POTENTIAL OF REVERSING OR MODIFYING THE 
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
It is axiomatic that an Appellant abandons any 
arguments not raised in his brief. (See Armstrong Rubber 
Company v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1983)). In point of 
fact, it is not the duty of this Court, nor any judicial 
body, to reach out and either litigate or review issues not 
properly brought before it by the parties. (See, by 
analoqy, Justice Stewart's opinion in Girard v. Appleby, 660 
P. 2d 245 (Utah 1983)). 
In the instant case, Appellant has raised five 
points on appeal. (AB 1-2) Points 1, 2 and 4 invoke this 
Court's power to reverse specific findings of fact entered 
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by the trial court. Points 3 and 5 apparently are posited 
on the arguments that the trial court, in failing to change 
venue or grant a continuance, aliu sed its discretion. In 
light of these five arguments, the following standards of 
appellate review are dispositive. 
In Utah, as in other jurisdictions, an appellant 
appropriately bears the burden of designating those portions 
of the record and transcript requisite to bear the burden 
for reversal. (See, ~' Franklin Financial v. New Empire 
Development, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983)). In the instant 
case, even had Appellant provided this Court with an 
appropriate record to allow such judicial review, because of 
the trial court's advantaged position, this Court would 
still endow the trial court's findings and judgment with 
considerable deference. (See Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 
430, 431 (Utah 1983); and Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins, 669 
P.2d 877, 883 (Utah 1983)). 
In the instant case, however, the record on appeal 
is totally bereft of the trial transcript. lmd, in the 
absence of a trial transcript, this Court must "assume that 
the proceedings at trial were regular and proper and that 
t.he judgment was supported by competent and sufficient 
evidence." (See Bevin v. J. J. Construction Company, Inc., 
669 p. 2d 442 (Utah 1983) ; Ba9nell v. Suburbia Land Com20ny, 
579 P. 2d 917 (Utah 1978) ; and Sawyers v. Saw~ers, 558 p. 2d 
607 (Utah 1976)) . Corollary to the above, the Supreme Co11r t 
can ill afford to s2eculate as to thP evidence adduced at 
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trial in order to reach findings of fact and conclusions of 
law contrary to those entered by the trial judge, who heard 
the testimony and observed the witnesses' demeanor in 
arriving at his findings. (See Beehive Medical Electronics 
.c.-v.c.-·---=S'--q.._u~a.::.r-=e---=D=---=C-=o-=-., 669 P.2d 861 (Utah 1983)). Thus, in the 
avsence of a transcript, there exists, implicitly and 
logically, a restriction on the very scope of the appellate 
process. 
Appellant's counsel, though certifying that he 
ordered the transcript of trial failed to request that the 
court reporter prepare one. Appellant's brief contains no 
references to the trial transcript because no such 
transcript presently exists; Appellant chose to appeal 
without the benefit of the transcript. Furthermore, of the 
twenty exhibits admitted at trial, only five were originally 
included in the envelope provided by the District Court 
Clerk. The remainder of the exhibits, including fourteen 
Fhotographs received in evidence remain sealed in Washington 
County. In light of this record, this Court should 
judiciously decline any reversal of the trial court's 
decisions. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING AFTER TRIAL THAT THE QUIT-CLAIM 
DEED DATED OCTOBER 23, 1977, AND RECORDED IN 1979, 
PERTAINING TO THE MARITAL HOME, IS A NULLITY AND WAS 
WRONGFULLY RECORDED IS CT.EAHLY SUSTAINABLE ON APPE/\L. 
In Appellant's first argument, he claims the trial 
court erred in ruling that a Quit-Claim Deed dated October 
23, 1977, was wrongfully recorded and had no effect at law. 
(AB at 8) Appellant failed to provide the Supreme Court 
with the trial transcript with which to review the trial 
court's findings pertaining to this issue; nonetheless, he 
requests that the specific finding entered by the trial 
court be reversed. As set forth in Point I, supra, as a 
practical matter, Appellant seeks Supreme Court speculation, 
and indeed clairvoyance on this point. (See Beehive Medical 
Electronics v. Square D Co., supra.). 
Appellant's first point on appeBl refers to 
§30-2-3 U.C.A., which provides as follows: 
A conveyance, transfer or lien executed by either 
husband or wife to or in favor of the other shall 
be valid to the same extent as between other 
persons. (Id., respondent's emphasis) 
Fespondent underscored the last eight words of the above 
code section because the same demonstrates the weakness of 
Appellant's arguments. Appellant cites several cases 
between pages 8 and 12 of his brief. The thrust of each is 
effectively to sustain valid conveyances between spouses, 
and to equitably deny relief from a true transfer of an 
interest in real estate. The Appellant indicates that the 
Respondent consented and approved to the conveyance 
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. by the fact that she signed the deed, the 
deed was acknowledged, and the husband 
subsequently took charge of the property and later 
recorded the deed, she thereby consenting to the 
termination of the entirety. (AB at 9) 
Appellant further states that as consideration for the deed 
the Toyota Celi ca was delivered to the Respondent. (Id.) 
None of the above, however, is true; the Respondent's 
testimony and the testimony of Mr. Thurber, who notarized 
the deed and witnessed the verbal agreement of the parties, 
was overwhelming that the instrument itself was not intended 
to convey title to real estate. (II at 145-56, 'II's 6-8) 
Thus, under the premises of the parties' agreement, the deed 
was to be destroyed and not recorded. 
Judge Burns found the following after hearing the 
testimony before him: 
11.nthony 
6. That on the 23rd day of October, 1977, 
the Plaintiff executed a Quit-Claim Deed to the 
Defendant, but that the Plaintiff had by such deed 
no immediate intent to transfer property or to 
irrevocably deliver the deed to the Defendant for 
recording. 
7. That in fact such deed on the basis of 
the overwhelming evidence offered was not to be 
recorded and was to be destroyed if the parties 
remained together as husband and wife within one 
year after the date of its execution. 
8. That such deed was wrongfully filed 
contrary to the agreement of the parties in March 
cf 1979, but that such deed as filed is a nullity. 
(Id.) 
These findings conform with the testimony of Mr. 
Thurber, who notarized the deed, and the 
Respondent's testimony; more importantly, these findings 
r·onfurm to the truth. Clearly, the Toyota was a gift, the 
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purchase of the same having occurred on October 7th, l 9r;. 
(I at 141) Appellant, however, surmises the following: 
No evidence was presented at Lhe trial court which 
would proffer the 'loyotn Celica as being a gift to 
the Plaintiff. (AB at 10) 
This is certainly an interesting statement, insofar as the 
Appellant failed to provide a trial transcript and 
subsequently complains that neither he nor his counsel 
attended the trial. (AB at Point V) Not being there, it 
eludes Respondent's counsel how Appellant can speculate on 
what the trial court heard or did not hear. 
Appellant's brief states that a conveyance from a 
wife to her husband is presumed to have some legal effect. 
Such a presumption, however, is not irrebuttable. Indeed, 
this Court has clearly held that parole evidence is 
admissible to construe a deed otherwise valid on its face as 
a mortgage, or, in some cases, as a nullity. (See,~· 
Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972)). 
Noteworthy, though P-1 was executed in 1977, it was not 
filed until 1979. Mr. Anthony Thurber explained that by 
October of 1978, insofar as the parties had resided together 
for one year, the deed was to be destroyed. Mrs. Lord, 
before the trial court, testified that her husband had 
phoned her and advised her that the recording of the deed 
itself was a mistake, and that he would have it removed. 
Instead, Appellant subsequently took the affinnative 
position that the deed was valid and given in exchaHge fc'r ,, 
car. To prevent Mr. Thurber's testimony from corroborating 
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that of his PX-wife, Appellant then attempted to preclude 
Mr. Thurber from testifying under subpoena before the trial 
court judge. 
For example, on January 4, 1983, Appellant's 
counsel relates his version of a conversation held with Mr. 
Thurber that same day. In paragraph 4 of that letter, P-4, 
Appellant's counsel states as follows: 
You acknowledged that Mr. Lord did in fact give an 
automobile to the Plaintiff in exchange for a 
Quit-Claim Deed to the home. That transaction is 
now in dispute and is to be among other items the 
subject matter of your testimony. 
While the above recitation, were it true, would 
bolster Appellant's allegations, Appellant's counsel then 
urges Mr. Thurber to personally file a formal motion to 
quash the subpoena and refuse to testify before the trial 
court. Why was Appellant's counsel so concerned that Mr. 
Thurber not appear if Mr. Thurber's testimony were as above 
stated? Mr. Thurber's reply on January 11th, 1983, directed 
to Appellant's counsel and introduced as Exhibit P-5 at 
trial is telling. Mr. Thurber states the following: 
This letter is written for 
correcting certain misstatements 
in your letter of January 4th, 
the above. 
the purpose of 
of fact appearing 
1983, concerning 
As I indicated to you most clearly in that 
conversation, the quit-claim deed in question was 
executed and delivered to David by Rebecca Lord in 
my presence on the express condition that it would 
be held unrecorded for a period of one year, and 
if the two remained together as husband and wife 
at the end of that period of time the deed would 
be destroyed. The statement appearing on the 
first page of your letter, 'You acknowledged that 
Mr. Lord did in fact give an automobile to the 
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Plaintiff in exchange for a quit-claim deed to the 
home' is entirely untrue. Ther•' was ci witnPss to 
the conversation of cJanuary 4th, 1483, wh< 1 s 
prepared to confirm that favt if necessary . . 1 
have no particular desire to become involved with 
someone else's marital problems. Both Dave and 
Becky have in the past been friends, although I've 
had no contact with either for some time. What 
Dave is attempting to do with the deed which I 
notarized (as a favor) is wrong. HP knows it's 
wrong, I know it's wrong, and Becky knows it's 
wrong. You know nothing except what you are told. 
What you have been told previously is wrong. 
I am not in the least concerned about your threats 
of complaint regarding ethical violations. I 
suggest that you seriously consider your own 
conduct in view of the criminal prohibitions 
against intimidation of witnesses, extortion, and 
subornation of perjury. 
On January 13th, 1983, Appellant's counsel replied 
to Mr. Thurber. In this letter, P-6, Appellant's recitation 
about the exchange of a car for execution of the Quit-Claim 
Deed is not related whatsoever. Indeed, in reply to Mr. 
Thurber, Appellant's counsel simply states that his client 
had a different recollection with regard to the one (1) year 
expiration date on the deed. (P-6) In a last-ditch effort 
to prevent Mr. Thurber from testifying, however, Appellant's 
counsel again suggests that Mr. Thurber's involvement with 
the parties precludes him from testifying at trial. 
At trial, Judge Burns ordered Mr. Thurber tu 
testify to those statements made by Appellant in Mr. 
Thurber's presence and Respondent's presence. His tPst1mony 
is incorporated in the findings of fact entered by thr trial 
court hereinbefore set forth. (II at 145-46, <l\'s 6-8) 
Those findings are strictly in conformity to the parameters 
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of §30-2-3, U.C.A., and the deed is valid "to the same 
Pxtent as between other persons." In Utah, if there is no 
µresent intent to convey property, and overwhelming 
testimony establishes that a deed was not to be recorded, 
but destroyed, our courts readily set them aside, either on 
the theory of constructive trust, mistake, fraud, or on 
other appropriate grounds. Similarly, in the instant case, 
faced with overwhelming evidence that the deed should not 
have been recorded, and, indeed, destroyed, the trial court 
appropriately found it to have been a nullity. 
Ultimately, Appellant argues that the trial judge, 
contrary to public policy, set aside a property settlement 
agreement. (AB at 10) There is no property settlement 
agreement in the instant case. Indeed, it is exactly the 
agreement of the parties, to-wit, that the deed be 
destroyed, that the trial court enforced. 
POINT III 
THERE APE INDEPENDENT GROUNDS UPON WHICH TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING FINDING THE DEED OF OCTOBER 23, 1977 
TO HAVE NO LEGAL EFFECT. 
On March 8, 1982, Respondent's motions for 
sanctions came before the trial court, pursuant to Rule 
37 (b) (2) (B) and (C) U.R.C.P. (ME 3-8-82) Consequently, a 
series of findings and discovery sanctions were entered by 
I ud9e Maurice D. Jones, then sitting as a District Court 
.ludge. (I at 158-59) Judge Jones' sanction effectively 
11ullified Appellant's contentions that the deed divested 
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Respondent of her one-half interest in the marital home; it 
states as follows: 
AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE, l 'l' IS HF RF BY ORDERED 
THAT Defendant shall hereinarter not be <llluwed to 
oppose Plaintiff's vested interest in one-half of 
the equity in the home located at 8950 Alpen Way 
in Sandy, Utah, on the basis of a Quit-Claim Deed 
dated October of 1977 and recorded eighteen months 
later without Plaintiff's consent or by other 
means (Id.) 
Significantly, Appellant did not appeal the sanction as thus 
entered by Judge Jones. Having failed to raise in his 
initial brief the validity of this sanction, Appellant has 
specifically abandoned any objection to it! (See Armstrong 
Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1983)). 
Clearly, such a sanction is sustainable under Utah 
law. (See, ~· Gardner and Gardner Builders v. Swapp, 656 
P.2d 429 (Utah 1983); Tucker Realty Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 
2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964)). In both of the above-cited 
cases, failure to provide discovery as previously ordered by 
the district court resulted either in the disobedient 
party's pleadings being stricken, or in the Nunley case, the 
irrunediate granting of a judgment against him. 
Though the trial court did not rely upon Judge 
Jones' discovery sanction in striking the deed, the result 
is the same, to-wit, that the deed have no effect 
whatsoever. A reversal of the trial court's explicit 
findings of fact regarding the invalidity of the deed would 
serve no other purpose than to reverse a previous JUdiri~l 
order validly entered, and frol'i which the Appe>llant has 
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sought no appellate relief. Simply stated, the sanction 
entered by cJud<Je cJones is but one other reason to sustain 
the trial court's ruling that the deed dated October 23, 
1977, be stricken and have no effect at law. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED IN RETURNING THE $5,023. 75 
ADVANCED TO THE FAMILY BUSINESS TO REIMBURSE THE RESPONDENT 
FOR A MONETARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE SAME. 
Point II of Appellant's brief states that under 
normal circumstances, a wife's financial contribution to the 
marriage is considered a gift, rather than a loan. (AB at 
13, citing Love v. Olsen, 645 P.2d 861 (Col. 1982)) 
Appellant then refers to 41 Am. Jur. 2d "Husband and Wife" 
§87 at p. 88, which states that in some states a husband's 
receipt and use of his wife's property, with her knowledge 
and consent, presumes a gift to the husband. Appellant 
fails to note to this Court, however, that the Love case 
expressly states that the issue of whether a gift between 
spouses was intended is one of fact, not presumption. 
Furthermore, Appellant conveniently deletes citation to 41 
Am. cJur. 2d "Husband and Wife" §86 at p. 88, wherein the 
authors clearly note that Utah law presumes the husband 
holds the wife's contribution for her ultimate use and 
benetit, absent contrary evidence. (Id., citing Little v. 
fld_1:~, 19 Utah 2d 162, 428 P.2d 156 (1%./)). 
Without a trial transcript, this Court must again 
dSsume that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's 
findings. In light of that standard of review, discussed in 
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Point I of this brief, there are two further <Jround:o to 
sustain return of the $5,023.75 advanced to the family 
business by ~espondent. 
First, the trial court clearly found that the 
$5,023.75 received by Respondent from her deceased 
grandmother's estate and used to pay back business taxes was 
not a gift, but rather an advance to that family business. 
As specifically set forth by the trial court: 
13. That the Plaintiff was an heir to Helen 
Sims Laub, whose estate was probated during the 
marriage, and that the Plaintiff advanced to 
Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, 
primarily to offset back taxes of that business 
and other economic reversals suffered by the 
parties, the sum of $5,023. 75, received directly 
from her inheritance by checks received from the 
executor of the Helen Sims Laub estate, and that 
Plaintiff is entitled to an equitable return of 
that money invested on the basis of the Court's 
rulings as later set forth herein from the joint 
property and other assets of the marriage. (II at 
14 7) 
Appellant desires this Court to overrule the trial 
court's finding that these monies were advanced to the 
family business, based .solely on conjecture that a 
"presumption of a gift" was not rebutted. Without a trial 
transcript, Appellant's position is untenable. 
There is yet a second reason to sustain the trial 
court's ruling requiring the return of the $5,023.75 
advanced to the marital business by Respondent. At trial, 
the district judge specifically found that the marital 
business known as Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis 
was capable of generating gross annual n;venues in excess of 
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$35,GOO.OO. (II at 145, 'll4) Furthermore, the trial court 
then procee<led to award the entire business to AppeJ lant, 
less and 
$5,023.75. 
excepting the 
(II at 148, 
single 
'!ll9; cf. 
debt 
II at 
to Respondent of 
147, 'l!13). Under 
Utah law, the trial court is charged with the duty of 
considering all of the assets of the parties, wherever 
obtained and from whatever source derived, and to take into 
consideration all of the circumstances of the parties in an 
effort to equitably divide the marital property. (See 
Brundell v. Rrundell, No. 16957, filed February 3, 1981 
(unpublished); Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 
1978); and Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976)). 
In the instant case, the trial judge chose to award the 
family business, which he found to have been created through 
the mutual efforts of both parties, to Appellant, as his 
sole property. In making this ruling, however, beyond 
finding that Respondent haq advanced certain monies from her 
own estate to the business, which monies should thus be 
returned to her as a matter of law, the court further found 
that equity required that the monies be returned. (II at 
147, 'Jll3) In finding that though Appellant was entitled to 
the business in its entirety, he must return these monies 
previously advanced by Respondent, the trial court was 
indeed endeavoring to provide a just and equitable 
Mi 1ustment of the parties' economic resources so that each 
n,1ght reconstruct his or her life on a happy and useful 
basis. (See Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979)). 
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Ultimately, on this second basis alone, the trial 
judge's wide discretion in dividing the marital property, 
and his findings thereon should not be disturbed unless the 
record clearly establishes an ab'Jse of discretion. (See 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980)). In the 
instant case, Appellant claims the trial court's discretion 
was abused. Once again, Appellant argues before this Court 
sans the benefit of the trial transcript. Respondent 
respectfully suggests that Appellant's requests, absent a 
transcript of trial, ask this Court to injudiciously divine 
and weigh the effect of testimony not before it. 
Respondent's inheritance was advanced to a very 
profitable family business. Though awarded the business, 
Appellant should equitably return these monies to 
Respondent. The trial court's findings are not only 
well-posited in the law, they do equity. 
POINT V 
/l_PPELLANT' S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE WAS NOT WELL-TAKEN; 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING THAT MOTION WAS APPROPRIATE 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Respondent concedes and the trial court found that 
Respondent moved to St. George no later than the early 
spring of 1980. Clearly, for purposes of Title 30 of the 
Utah Code, there was appropriate venue for bringing her 
divorce over a year later in June of 19 81 . (I at 1) On 
appeal, as below, Appellant belatedly pursues the novel 
theory that once the parties were divorced, the trial court 
sitting in Washington County had no further jurisdiction to 
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divide the marital assets, a larger portion of which was 
situate in Salt Lake County. This argument assumes that the 
district court's equitable powers, pursuant to Title 30 of 
the Utah Code, are in rem in nature, and not in personam. 
In point of fact, with in personam jurisdiction over both 
parties, venue is proper as long as either resided in the 
county of record three months prior to the commencement of 
the action. (See §30-3-1, U.C.A.). 
The initial decree of divorce, on the basis of the 
bifurcated trial, was filed on May 28th, 1982. (I at 265) 
In that decree, the court expressly reserved the issues of 
property division, insofar as discovery from Appellant was 
incomplete at that time. Appellant's motion for change of 
venue was then filed on October 20th, 1982, approximately 
sixteen months after the initiation of the divorce 
proceedings by Respondent, and after several motions, 
objections, and other documents, subsequent to the initial 
hearing on the bifurcated divorce had been filed. (II at 
87; cf. I at 265 and all documents filed subsequent 
thereto) . Appellant's motion at trial, as well as his 
arguments on appeal, are not well-taken for the following 
reasons: 
A. Washington County venue is proper. 
As previously stated, §30-3-1 U.C.A. sets 
t<>rlh the requirements for divorce. Therein the trial court 
may proceed "in any county where the Plaintiff shall have 
been an actual and bona fide resident of this state and of 
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the county where the action is brought for thi Pl' 
months next prior to the commencement of the action 
Appellant contends that once tht• trial cc>urt qrant."d the 
divorce, the action was conve l ted to all l r. rem pr•JCc>Pd i ng, 
and proper venue to divide the marital property existed only 
in the Salt Lake County. Appellant's argument, however 
avoids the clear thrust of §30-3-5 of the Utah Code which, 
as construed by this Court, prov ides the tr ia 1 court with 
continuing jurisdiction, both before and after the divorce 
decree, to direct orders pertaining to the distribution of 
marital property, regardless of its nature, so long as the 
court has proper personal jurisdiction over both parties. 
Indeed, Utah' trial courts are mandated to consider the 
assets of the parties "wherever obtained and from whatever 
source derived" and indeed, from all appearances, the words 
"and wherever situate" should be added to the mandate. (See 
Brundell v. Brundell, 
(unpublished) , quoting 
No. 16957, filed February 3' 1981 
Englert 
(Utah 1978); and Dogu v. Dogu, 
v. Englert, 
652 p. 2d 1308 
576 P.2d 1274 
(Utah 1982)). 
In Dogu, for example, this Court considered the ownership 
interests in a condominium in Turkey purchased by the 
parties during the marriage. 
In the instant case, Respondent absurdly contends 
that even with in personam jurisdiction over both parties, 
the trial court may not consider a marital asset ou+s1dP of 
its county when an appropriate niutinn to chri.ngf-' <.r~n\11, t 1 tf\ 1' 
location of the marital property has L><·tn tilt·cl. Thjs 
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f10s1tiun is untenahle. Clearly, the Utah trial court had 
JUrisdiction over the parties' marital property, 
µctrticularly where all of it was situate within Utah. 
B. The Appellant, at the time of filing his 
ffiolion to change venue, had long since waived any objection 
regarding that issue. 
Appellant's specious objection to venue, even 
were the same to have some validity at law, has been waived. 
ObJections to venue are required to be presented pursuant to 
Rule 12(b) (3), U.R.C.P., but as set forth in such rule: 
A motion making any of these defenses shall be 
made before pleading if further pleading is 
permitted. (Id., emphasis added) 
Rule 12(h) U.R.C.P. further provides that failure to include 
an objection to venue on or before the time that an initial 
pleading is called for in a case waives that objection. 
Similarl~·. §78-13-8 U.C.A. provides that even assuming, 
nrguendo, that Washington County were not otherwise the 
proper county for the trial of the action, nonetheless, the 
action would be tried in Washington County, unless the 
Defer.dant, at the time he answers or otherwise appears, 
files a motion, in writing, that the trial be held in 
another county. 
C. Absent a finding of an abuse of discretion, 
the denial of the motion to change venue cannot be reversed. 
Appellant's contention that Washington County 
,,; '" nc't th" µroper venue to divide the marital asset is 
1, t,dly specious. Belatedly filed, the argument itself was 
1·.·,·d 1,y its ur.timely assertion alone. Beyond this, 
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however, the question of whether venue should be chilnged 
largely rests in the judgment of the trial court. As a 
result, this Court has repeatedly held that a trial court's 
ruling on a motion to change venue will not be reversed 
absent an abuse of discretion in either granting or denying 
that motion. (See, ~, Estate of Thorley, 579 P.2d 927 
(Utah 1978)). In the instant case, no such abuse of 
discretion is seen. Rather, the trial court found the 
motion untimely, and specious, and duly entered its order 
denying that change. (II at 125) Clearly, though the 
primary marital asset was a home situate in Salt Lake 
County, the trial court's power to equitably divide the 
marital assets, pursuant to Chapter 3 of Title 30 of the 
Utah Code, enabled it to divide the marital assets wherever 
situate. 
A change of venue based on a motion belatedly made 
some eighteen months after the divorce complaint had been 
validly filed would, in fact, have been abusive. 
Appellant's motion had, as its apparent purpose, the delay 
of trial. Appellant's arguments on this point should be no 
more well received on appeal than they were at the trial 
court level. 
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POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF 
$9,000.00 TO RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL WAS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES; THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE 
THIS FINDING OF FACT, ABSENT A TRANSCRIPT. 
The trial court has great discretion in awarding 
attorney's fee~ in a divorce proceeding, and the issue may 
be viably considered on post-judgment hearings as well. 
(See Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979)). In the 
instant case, the court heard at trial the testimony of two 
attorneys pertaining to an appropriate amount for an award 
of attorney's fees. (ME 1-19-83) Consequently, the trial 
court's following findings re attorney's fees are 
significant: 
6. That on the 23rd day of October, 1977, 
the Plaintiff executed a Quit-Claim Deed to the 
Defendant, but that the Plaintiff had by such deed 
no immediate intent to transfer property or to 
irrevocably deliver the deed to the Defendant for 
recording. 
7. That in fact such deed on the basis of 
the overwhelming evidence offered was not to be 
recorded and was to be destroyed if the parties 
remained together as husband and wife within one 
year after the date of its execution. 
8. That such deed was wrongfully filed 
contrary to the agreement of the parties in March 
of 1979, but that such deed as filed is a null~ty. 
9. That the Plaintiff has been required, in 
overcoming the Defendant's position that such deed 
conveyed away her interest in the marital home, to 
subpoena witnesses and to retain the services of 
an attorney. 
10. That in pursuing this matter generally 
before the Court, Plaintiff was required to retain 
the services of an attorney, and had been placed 
in a position by the Defendant which equitably 
requires some offset of the Plaintiff's legal 
expenses. 
11. That the proceedings in this case have 
been lengthy, involving one prior appeal which 
[sic] dismissed summarily by the Supreme Court, 
and several motions which have been heard before 
W019/8l-3944 51 
several judges sitting pro tern, or by ,1pt•roµriate 
judicial appointment. 
12. That an apprupr1ate evidentiary basis 
for attorney's fees was providerl bPfnr~ the 
District Court, indicating thdl as of the date ot 
trial the Plaintii f's fees were appre;aching the 
sum of $13,000.00, thilt testimony was offered 
which might otherwise supµort an awarrl in excess 
of that amount. (II at 146-47, emphasis added) 
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court 
entered a further finding which reduced the award of 
attorney's fees as follows: 
18. The Court further finds that ~he 
Plaintiff, as and for attorney's fees to partially 
offset those expenses payable by her, is entitled 
to the sum of $9,000.00. (II at 148) 
Again, this award of attorney's fees is largely 
discretionary with the trial court, and, absent any abuse, 
it should not be reversed. In Point IV of his brief, 
Appellant's counsel contends that the Appellant, a cuckold, 
was inequitably required to pay attorney's fees to an 
adulterous Respondent, who desired to get divorced solely so 
she could marry another man. Appellant fails to note, 
however, that these allegations so blithely recited in his 
brief were not raised at trial. As such, these "equitable 
arguments" should not be considered on appeal. (See 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983)). Indeed, 
without a transcript, Appellant requests that this Court 
speculate that an abuse existed in order to reverse the 
trial court's award of attorney's fees. But, absent a 
transcript, this Court is requ i rerl to as sum" "that the 
proceedings therein were regular and that the determination 
W019/81-3944 ') 2 
made was supported by competent and sufficient evidence.• 
(See Estate of Thorley, 579 P.2d 927 at 930 (Utah 1978), 
citing inter alia, Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah 
l 976)) • 
['_ppellant' s argument seeking denial of 
Respondent's attorney's fees is also falsely bottomed on the 
theory that, being adulterous, she should be punished for 
her sins. Clearly, the broad powers granted to trial 
courts, pursuant to §30-3-5 U.C.A. do not include the 
purpose of punishment, particularly when a large amount of 
Appellant's fees were spent disproving a wrongfully filed 
deed and resisting two prior frivolous appeals. 
Lastly, Appellant draws an analogy from that 
portion of §30-3-5 U.C.A. which may terminate alimony where 
a former spouse cohabits with a person of the opposite sex. 
The analogy is not well-taken. As set forth in Knuteson v. 
Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980), a former husband was 
estopped from asserting the clear import of the statute 
where his wife's sexual relationship with another was the 
result of the former husband's own actions. In the instan~ 
case, it cannot be gainsaid that at trial the district court 
received testimony that Appellant, three years before the 
parties' separation, conceived a plan whereby he would 
tntally deprive his wife of all affection, and indeed even 
casual contact. His avowed and expressed concept regarding 
this so-called "plan" was to force his wife into an 
adulterous relationship and so embarrass her that he could 
WOIY/81-3944 53 
obtain a divorce on his own terms. The fact that two yecrs 
after the parties' separation and with no contact with 
Appellant that Respondent woulc~ Lill in love' with anothPr 
man is no surprise. Furthermore, Respondent's uttorney's 
fees were largely spent in resisting Appellant's false 
claims. 
Appellant's brief repeatedly indicates that 
Respondent had a lengthy courtship with one Dennis Rogers. 
(See, ~· AB at 4). In point of fact, the Respondent 
became acquainted with Mr. Rogers on an intimate basis only 
after being separated from her husband for over a year and a 
half and after being denied any affection from him, in even 
the most minimal regard, for over four and a half years. 
Clearly, Respondent's analogy to alimony is not well-taken. 
Indeed, absent a transcript, this Court should presume, and 
indeed conclude, that appropriate evidence supports the 
equitable award to the Respondent of an attorney's fee in 
the instant case. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAJ, COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL SETTING DID 
NOT ABUSE THAT COURT'S DISCRETION; APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
PERTAINING TO HIS MOTION MISSTATE BOTH THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE AND THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
A. The trial court committed no error at law in 
proceeding to trial; Appellant's abortive notice of appeal, 
filed January 19th, 1983, is a nullity and did not divest 
the trial court of jurisdiction. 
On the 19th day of January, 1983, Appellant 
filed his second "notice of appeal" in the instant case. 
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/1ppellant' s notice, unnumbered in the record, states as 
follows: 
Notice is hereby given that David Lord George 
[sic] Defend~nt/Appellant in the above-entitled 
action, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court 
from an order that Defendant's motion for a change 
of venue is denied, rendered on January 11th, 
1983, by the HONORABLE J. HARLAN BURNS. 
Appellant's motion to change venue discussed supra was filed 
with the trial court on October 20th, 1982. (II at 87) At 
Appellant's request, the trial court heard arguments almost 
immediately subsequent thereto, and on October 21, 1982, 
orally denied Appellant's motion. The above is recited in 
Appellant's "protective notice of appeal", filed on January 
4th, 1983, apparently to preserve Appellant's right to 
sul>sequently appeal this ruling, as provided for in Rule 
72(a) U.R.C.P. 
As previously stated, Appellant personally 
promised the Respondent that this case would be the longest 
divorce case in the history of Utah. (I at 184, ~9) 
Apparently in furtherance of his client's desires, 
Appellant's counsel submitted a formal order denying his 
motion for change of venue which, absent any completed 
mailing certificate, was executed on January 11th, 1983, and 
duly filed by the court. (II at 125-26) From this order, 
Appellant's counsel subsequently filed a "notice of appeal", 
purportedly under Rule 73(b) U.R.C.P., on the very date of 
trial. The text of this notice is recited, supra. 
Appellant's motion to continue the trial, pending the 
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resolution of this "appeal" was al so hand-delivered to the 
trial court on the very dc,y "f t 11<11. 
Tbr· trial cou1t, Licec! with this so-ccilled "notice 
of appeal" and motion for continuance, neither of which had 
been delivered to Respondent's counsel, ruled on the same 
from the bench. The Judge's own formal order denying the 
continuance, subsequently drafted by him and o~dered filed 
pursuant to Rule S(e), U.R.C.P., on January 19th, 1983, is 
reproduced verbatim as follows: 
1. That the trial set for the 19th day of 
January, 1983, is the second half of a bifurcated 
trial, the first portion of which was tried in 
1982. 
2. That the Notice of Trial was duly sent 
by the Clerk of the Court to all parties, and that 
the Plaintiff at some expense has appeared with 
her witnesses and counsel, prepared and ready to 
go forward. 
3. That the basis for a continuance, based 
upon the allegation of improper venue is not well 
taken, insofar as the motion to change venue was 
not presented timely pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and such objection, 
if any, was waived, and jurisdiction is properly 
vested in this Court pursuant to Title 30 of the 
Utah Code. 
4. That this Court's earlier Order Denying 
Venue is interlocutory in nature and that no 
appeal lies therefrom, but that the relative 
merits of the Defendant's position, if any, 
regarding improper venue may be preserved on 
appeal from the final disposition of this case. 
See Schram-Johnson Drugs v. Cox, 7 9 Utah 2 7 6, 9 
P.2d 399. 
The Court finds, therefore, that the denial 
of venue, being interlocutory in nature, gives 
rise only to a petition for interlocutor~ appeal, 
or, if such motion were to have been made 
promptly, a potentictl extraordinary writ as set 
forth in the case of Angell v. The Sixth Judicial 
District Court, No. 18651, decided October 4, 
1982. As the motion for continuance is posited 
primarily about a potential appeal from this order 
which is not appealable prier to trial, it is not 
W019/81-3944 56 
well taken, being filed untimely, and not 
tekphunically communicated to Plaintiff's 
counsel. Further, as there is no allegation that 
lhe Defendant or his attorney was otherwise 
unavailable for purposes of trial, the Court in 
its discretion hereby denies the verified motion 
for continuance. (II at 141-47-) 
App.,llant's "notice of appeal" was filed with the 
Supreme Court on January 26th, 1983. (See notice of 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Supreme Court, filed 
February 2, 1983 in II). On the Supreme Court's own motion, 
this second appeal, No. 18959 (previous appeal being No. 
18395), was dismissed on March 23, 1983, based on reasoning 
similar to the trial court's: 
This da¥ this matter is hereby dismissed on the 
Court's own motion, as the appeal is from an order 
which is not final. There is no direct appeal in 
this jurisdiction from an order granting or 
refusing a change of venue. See Hale v. Barker, 
70 Utah 284, 259 P. 928 (1927). (See II, document 
immediately preceding R-178). ~-
On this appeal, Appellant submits that though his 
earlier appeal re venue did not confer jurisdiction upon the 
Supreme Court, it, nonetheless, effectively stayed all 
further proceedings in the trial court. In Appellant's own 
words: 
Once a district court has submitted a matter to 
the Utah Supreme Court on appeal, all further 
proceedings in the lower court come to a 
stalldstill until it is either ruled upon by the 
Supreme Court or remanded to the lower court for 
further action. Even if the ruling denying change 
of venue is interlocutory in nature, once that 
matter has been submitted to the Utah Supreme 
Court, the only alternative avenue which opposing 
counsel has open to him is to raise the issue with 
the Supreme Court for the purpose of having the 
appeal denied, and even in that instance the 
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this 
district court is without the power 
further until the Supreme Court rules. 
to proceed 
(Al:J at 1 7) 
The Appellant offers no citation in support of 
textual statement; in fact, the Sdme tutally 
misrepresents the law of the State of Utah. As stated in 4A 
C.J.S. "Appeal and Error", §606 at 394: 
[A]lthough an appeal is attempted, if no appeal is 
given by law or if it is irregularly taken, the 
appellate court, as a rule, does not acquire 
jurisdiction, and the lower court retains 
jurisdiction of the case and may review its 
judgment before rendering a proper one, or take 
such other action as may be within its powers. 
The above citation from C.J.S. cites, inter alia, to the 
Utah case of Centennial Mill Company v. Martinoff, 83 Utah 
39, 28 P.2d 602 (1934). In Martinoff, the Utah Supreme 
Court considered the effect of an abortive attempt to 
perfect an appeal from a judgment not final in nature. 
Chief Justice Straup, writing for the Utah Supreme Court, 
ruled as follows: 
In the next place the appeal is taken while a 
motion duly made and filed for a new trial of the 
cause was pending and undisposed of and the appeal 
dismissed because it was not from a final judgment 
was abortive and of no more consequence than if no 
appeal had been attempted. The appeal thus being 
a nullity and the amendment to the findings 
permitted before the motion for a new trial was 
ruled upon. The [district] court had 
authority to allow the amendment. (28 P. 2d at 
604) 
The Martinoff case has been cited favorably by the 
Montana Supreme Court in State v. District Court, 279 P. 2d 
691 (Montana 1955). Here, in ruling on whether an abc·rt ivc 
notice of appeal divested the probate court c•f Jurisdiction, 
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thee Moncc>na SGtJre>me Court held that where the Supreme Court 
rlid not ir1 fact acquire jurisdiction, the matter stood below 
,ft<:r che appectls WPre taken precisely as before. (Id. at 
694, c1t1ng, inter alia, Centennial Mill Company v. 
Martinoff, supra) Judge Davis for the Montana Supreme 
Court also quoted favorably from a Washington Supreme Court 
decision, State v. McDowall, 197 Washington 334, 85 P.2d 665 
(Wash. 1938), as follows: 
An attempted appeal from an order which is not in 
fact appealable cannot operate to tie the hands of 
~Superior Court, as, if the rule were 
otherwise, a party could indefinitely delay a 
proceeding by attempting to appeal from every 
adverse rulin made rior to the entr of final 
judgment. (279 P.2d at 694, emphasis added 
The Montana Supreme Court then noted that authority for the 
proposition that an abortive notice of appeal divested the 
trial court of jurisdiction was wanting. (Id.) 
The policies as set forth in the Montana case of 
State v. District Court, supra, are no less applicable here. 
The notice of appeal from the order denying venue was 
ill-conceived at its inception and filed with little other 
purpose than to delay trial proceedings. Clearly, an 
at tempted appea 1 from an order otherwise nonappealable in 
nature ~rPS not divest the lower court of jurisdiction. 
The Utah and Montana Supreme Court decisions are 
v'l' l 1 supported by thosP of other jurisdictions. For 
,,,,mµlce, ir. Wi lmurth v. First Judicial District Court, 393 
1· =d 302 (Nev. 1964), the Nevada Supreme Court, citing 
fr0rn Tennessete and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
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Appeals, held simply that an attempted appedl 
nonappealable order does not divest the lowPr c(Jurt of 
jurisdiction. (See 393 P.2d 307 ar 303), S 1 ml l ,-, r l y, l n Sh n 
Juan v.~. 341 P.2d 872 (We<»li. \9SY), fq,,,~,EJlanl'., as 
here, contended that the trial court had erred in proceeding 
to hear a !Tlatter after Appellants had filed notices of 
appeal from the trial court's orders rejecting an affidavit 
of prejudice, striking Appellants' answer and denying 
Appellants a jury trial and setting the cause for hearing. 
The Washington Supreme Court held that none of these 
intermediate rulings were appealable, and insofar as "[n] o 
valid appeal was pending as a result of these notices; 
hence, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction to proceed 
with the cause." (341 P.2d at 873) 
Similarly, in the instant case, Appellant's 
abortive notice of appeal from an order denying the change 
of venue, which order was not even arguably appea lab le to 
the Utah Supreme Court, did not divest the trial court of 
jurisdiction, and it, too, had the authority to proceed with 
the cause of action. Simply stated, jurisdiction in a case 
is always somewhere; it is not placed in limbo by an 
abortive appeal. 
B. This Court should not consider belated 
allegations supportive of a motion for continuar.ce when Lhe 
same were not presented to the trial court, and in fact 
constitute misstatements of fact before the Supreme Court. 
The trial court 1 s order (]('J1'1'lfi(l 
continuance, reproduced, supra, notccs that at Lr1,1\ tlH 
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l<cS[Jondent cippPared, that her witnesses had flown down from 
Salt Lake City, and that Respondent's counsel had not even 
''"ceivecJ a ropy of the motion for continuance, nor indeed 
'"1 verbal notification of the same. 
trial court further noted that 
(II at 414-42) 
the matter had 
The 
been 
previously set for trial, but that the trial had been 
vacated by yet an earlier abortive appeal, specifically No. 
18395. (Id.) Lastly, the trial court's denial of the 
continuance states that "there is no allegation that the 
Defendant or his attorney was otherwise unavailable for 
purposes of trial . As a result of the 
foregoing, the trial court proceeded with the matter 
previously set before it. 
On appeal, Appellant now asserts that he had a 
right to be present at trial. This argument was nowhere set 
forth in the hand-delivered motion for continuance. Though 
unreproduced in the record on appeal, this hand-written 
rn<:;l i.on for continuance, in the trial court's own words, 
cuntained no alleqation whatsoever that either the Appellant 
or his counsel were otherwise unable to attend trial. 
Indeed, their motion to continue was bottomed solely upon 
the contention that the abortive "notice of appeal" from the 
order denying venue divested the trial court of jurisdiction 
and would effectively delay any trial of the cause of 
1 ('1 ion. ( 1 u.) 
On appeal, Appellant further states, as if the 
s ime "'' 1" pcirt of the record, that the Respondent's key 
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witness ". . called defense counsel the night befnr.0 trial 
and stated that because an appeal had been made he would not 
make appearance in Court the fol luwing day." (AD at 17) 
This argument was also not prupounded tu the trial cuurt, 
and for good reasons. First, no appeal had been filed on 
January 18, 1983. Second, the key witness, Mr. Anthony 
Thurber, was present in the courtroom. Having since heard 
Appellant's counsel's belated representations on appeal that 
such statements were made, Mr. Thurber independently filed 
an affidavit with this Court which states that in point of 
fact the above representations were not true. Mr. Thurber's 
affidavit is contained in the appendix hereto and the 
statements contained in paragraphs 4 through 6 thereof are 
reproduced, supra, at p. 23. 
C. An order denying a continuance is 
discretionary in nature; it should not be reversed absent a 
showing that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Rule 40 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides the following guidelines to the trial court in 
granting or denying a motion for continuance: 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its 
discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, 
including the payment of costs as may be just . 
postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. 
Clearly, under the above standard, the Utah Supreme Court 
should not reverse the ruling of a trial court denying a 
continuance, absent a showing that the trial court abused 
its discretion. (See Sharp v. Canak is Gianulakis, 63 Utal' 
:.!49, 225 P. 337 (1924)). Appellant now argues that he was 
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denied an opportunity to attend trial. This argument is 
nr,wly raised un appeal. The trial court below found that 
che hand-delivered motion to it contained no 
allegations that the Defendant or his attorney was otherwise 
unavailable for purposes of trial." (II at 142) Under such 
circumstances, where Respondent had been required to 
subpoena and pay the expenses of two separate witnesses to 
travel from Salt Lake to Washington County, and was present 
in the courtroom and ready to proceed, the refusal to 
continue the trial on the basis of a motion filed on the 
date of trial did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
A similar example of a trial court's refusal to 
grant a motion for continuance can be gleaned from the case 
of First Security Bank v. Johnson, 540 P.2d 521 (Utah 1975). 
In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously held that 
where a claim had been filed in 1972, followed by a long 
series of interrogatories and a plethora of discovery 
mot ions, and the trial had been previously continued, and 
where the trial date of September 12th 1974, had been 
previously set on May 13th of that year, a belated request 
nine days prior to the trial for a continuance was properly 
rejected by the trial court. In so ruling, this Court 
favorably reflected on the denial for continuance as 
tullows: 
Had the trial JUdge acted otherwise, he could have 
reflected only prejudice in favor of Defendant, 
but certainly not against him. (540 P.2d at 522) 
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Certainly, h1 stccry of Lh1" 
particularly the diSCQVE.:rj fl'];-- ri I l,1lfH=d ]\1 tV./U \'UlllmcS Uf 
records before th,- c-u, '.- "'f- \Al'- l I ,1 ', " f 1t" 11,.,1() pr· j ( ir 
appeals, and the pre\.-1uu:, ( u1ll-11-uc-11,1_'t' (li thic tr1J1 setting, 
reflect little more than an inordinate delay occasioned by 
Appellant's attempts to prevent this matter from coming to 
trial. Exemplary was Appellant's obtrusive and ultimately 
contemptuous resistance of Respondent's straightforward 
procedural requests solely to obtain an appraisal on the 
marital home. (II at 131-138) 
Furthermore, not unlike 
Respondent's 
19th, 198 2, 
19th, 1983 
request for trial setting 
and the notice of trial 
was duly filed with the 
the Johnson case, 
was filed on August 
setting for January 
district court, and 
mailed to all counsel by the trial court executive November 
2nd, 
of a 
1982. To have then granted a continuance on the basis 
motion, hand-delivered on the date of trial, and 
without any prior notice, even telephonic, to Respondent's 
counsel would truly have been an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. In 1 ight of the record, the trial court's 
denial of Appellant's motion for continuance does not rise 
to an abuse of discretion; indeed, it is a decision that is 
laudatory. A continuance in January of 1983 would have 
served little purpose other than to have JUdrcially favored 
Appellant and allowed him to once aaain keep his prum1s» 1,. 
Respondent that this, in fact, woulcJ b1c "the longest divot n 
in the history of Utah." (1 at 184, '!19) 
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Th~ Respondent strenuously urges that there are no 
veil id facts or grounds that this Court may consider which 
cnn,pel the conclusion that the trial court, in denying 
Appe 11 i'lnt' s motion for continuance, abused its discretion. 
Neither the Appellant nor his counsel contended below that 
they were unavailable for trial. Indeed, they bottomed 
their motion on an abortive notice of appeal, and risked 
their nonattendance based upon their miscalculated 
speculation that the trial court would wrongfully feel 
divested of jurisdiction. Their decision not to attend 
trial was done despite their knowledge that the Respondent 
and her counsel would be present in court, and that 
witnesses, at a great expense to Respondent, had been 
subpoenaed some 330 miles from Salt Lake County to the site 
of trial. Appellant's counsel did not exercise the most 
minimal courtesy to even telephonically advise Respondent's 
counsel of his purported motion. In light of the above, it 
can hardly be gainsaid that the court appropriately denied 
the same. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT VIII 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO TIMELY PERFECT AN APPEAL IN THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
As stated in the Statement of Facts, supra at 31, 
d brief recitation of facts is probative in evaluating 
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whether Appellant has perfected his third appeal beforu the 
Supreme Court. The documents upon which Appellant bases 
this third appeal are des1yndtrd in tile rt-'C<>Ld as tcdlows: 
The Supplemental Decree and Judgment Pertaining to 
Distribution of Property, entered after non jury trial on 
January 19th, 1983, and filed on January 31, 1983, is that 
judgment from which Appellant presently seeks to perfect his 
appeal. (II at 152) The not ice of appeal, that is, that 
document by which the Appellant sought to perfect the 
jurisdiction of this Court in appeal No. 19167 appears in II 
at 178. It states as follows: 
Notice is hereby given that David George Lord, 
Defendant/Appellant in the above-entitled action, 
hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from an 
order on a SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE AND JUDGMENT 
PERTAINING TO DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY, rendered 
by this court on January 19th, 1983, with appeal 
time stayed by Defendant/Appellant's motion to 
vacate judgment. This court denied 
Defendant/Appellant's motion and entered an order 
of denial on March 21st, 1983. (Id.) 
Though the notice of appeal appears to be dated the 12th day 
of April, 1983, it was not filed with the appropriate fees 
by the Washington County Clerk until April 25th, 1983. (II 
at 178) While the supplemental decree rendered by the trial 
court on January 19, 1983, was not technically executed and 
filed until January 31st, 1983, no motion staying the time 
to file an appeal, pursuant to Rule 73(a) U.R.C.P., coupled 
with Rules SO(b), 52(b) or 59 U.R.C.P., was filed with the 
District Court until March 3, 1983, when AppL'llant filed ? 
motion to vacate this judgment. (II at 163) un March 8th, 
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1983, the motion to vacate was overruled and denied, and the 
District Court's formal order denying Defendant's motion to 
vacatP the Judgment was filed on March 21, 1983. (ME 
3-8-83; see also II at 176) 
Appellant's counsel prepared a document dated the 
12th of April, 1983, wherein he acknowledged that his motion 
to vacate judgment was denied by the trial court's order 
entered on the 21st day of March, 1983. This document 
seeking to exonerate a prior appeal cost bond was filed in 
Volume II of the record on April 18th, 1983. Appellant's 
notice of appeal, however, was not filed until April 25th, 
1983, one month and four days after the March 21, 1983 
denial of the motion to vacate the January 31, 1983 
judgment. (II at 178; cf. II at 176; and 152-56). 
A. An untimely motion, even if liberally 
construed to have been filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52 or 59 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not toll the time 
1 n which the Appellant may perfect his appeal from the 
Supplemental Decree and Judgment. 
Untimely motions, even if construed to have been 
filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52 and 59 U.R.C.P., do not toll 
the time in which Appellant could perfect his appeal from 
the Supplemental Decree and Judgment Pertaining to 
Distribution of Property, docketed January 31, 1983. (See 
Armstrong Rubber Company v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346 at 1348 
(Utah 1983)). A timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional. 
(See Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)). 
''"re, a motion to vacate the Supplemental Decree and 
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Judgment was not docketed with the d1str1cl c•,u1t llt't1l 
March 3, 1983. 
from were duly filc'd '" ,i,i!HL>t' _', j I I \.; K JI t I 1 f l l nit' t ()I 
perfecting an appeal endeu ''" FeLruary Lil, 1Y83. (Se<? In re -- - -
Lynches' Estate, 254 P.2d 454 (Utah 1953)). Simply stated, 
Appellant's untimely motion to vacate Judgment filed on 
March 3, 1983 does not restart the period in which to seek 
appellate review before this Court from a judgment and order 
filed on January 31, 1983. The notice of appeal prepared by 
the Defendant/Appellant mistakenly states that the time 
within which to appeal was stayed by his motion to vacate 
judgment docketed on March 3, 1983. This motion, however, 
having been docketed well after the appeal time from the 
supplemental decree had expired, does not renew the time 
within which to perfect an appeal from such earlier decree 
and Judgment. That time expired February 28, 1983. 
B. Even assuming that the motion to vacate 
Judgment filed on March 3, 1983 somehow stayed the time 
within which to file an appeal, Appellant's notice of 
appeal, as actually filed, still does not operate to confer 
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 
As set forth above, the motion to vacate judgment 
was denied on March 8, 1983, and a formal order was duly 
docketed by the district court on March 21, 1983. 
Appellant, who acknowledged the existence of that order on a 
document filed April 18, 1983, nonetheless did not file his 
notice of appeal with the district court and pay his fees 
until April 25th, 1983, a month and four days after the 
order denying the motion to vacate judgment was filed. (II 
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at 178' clerk's date) The effect of this untimely 
d,">ckct in<3, without any order of extension from the district 
<:c•urt, is iatal to the appeal. Indeed, as set forth by 
Chief Justice Hall in Isaacson v. Darius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 
1983), the mailing of a notice of appeal is not equivalent 
to its formal filing as required by Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P. 
Chief Justice Hall's analysis of the rule is demonstrative: 
Had those exercising the broad rule-making powers 
of this Court seen fit to do so, they could have 
added the further exception [to Rule 73 (a) 
U.R.C.P.] endowing the "mailing" of a notice of 
appeal with the same stature as the "filing" of a 
notice of appeal, as required under Rule 7 3 (a) . 
(Id.) 
Noting that Rule 73(a) was not so broadly drafted, the 
Isaacson court rejected Appellant's contention. Similarly, 
Appellant's failure in the instant case to timely file his 
notice of appeal, even assuming the motion to vacate had 
properly stayed the time within which to perfect an appeal, 
is jurisdictional in nature. As the motion to vacate was 
formally denied on the 21st day of March, 1983, the failure 
of the Appellant to file his notice of appeal until April 
25th, 1983, is jurisdictional, and this appeal, as the two 
appeals prior to it, is unperfected before this Court. (See 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)). 
POINT IX 
l>FON REMAND, RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL HEARING 
PERTAINING TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The power of a trial court to equitably award 
attorney's fees in a divorce proceeding is well-recognized 
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in the State of Utah. Certainly this powe1, s1m1 Lir tu 
other cases, should equally extend tc' ct [JussiL>le 
determination of attorney's f,_,, s t, u sul·('0c~:ful f)cJrt~ (·n 
appeal, if so requested a.nd urought !H''"re ttn:o Cuurl. (See 
Jenkins v. Bailey, No. 18526, decided January 12, 1984; 
Centurion Corporation v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706 at 713 (Utah 
1981); and Management Services Corporation v. Development 
Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980)). 
In the instant case, Respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court recognize the possibility upon 
remand that she may be entitled to further attorney's fees, 
if the circumstances justly require their award. 
Respondent has contended that this Court 
Insofar as 
lacks any 
jurisdiction to hear the matter, Respondent is ill at ease 
to request that this Court in fact award additional fees on 
appeal. Nonetheless, Respondent simply urges that in 
remanding this matter to the trial court for further 
disposition, that the issue of further fees not be precluded 
by this Court's decision. Indeed, as specifically set forth 
by this Court in Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978), 
insofar as the Respondent has been put to the necessity of 
defending this, the third specious appeal in this case, it 
is only equitable that Appellant, upon remand, bear the 
costs of appeal, including a reasonable attorney's fee for 
Respondent's counsel. 
This point lS raised simply tu 
Respondent's request, pursuant to the Carter case cited 
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supra. It is clear th<lt the determination of an appropriate 
ctward of c1ttorney's fees is one which by the Carter case is 
.ippropri<ltely left, upon remand, to the trial court. (Id.) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court are ill-conceived, absent the complete record 
and transcript being certified for appeal. Absent a 
transcript, this Court must assume that the proceedings 
below were proper, and that an appropriate evidentiary 
foundation existed for each of the trial court's findings. 
Appellant raises factual allegations not supported 
by the record, and, indeed, contrary to the findings, to the 
testimony at trial, and to the truth. Respondent's 
assertions, however, were established by "overwhelming" 
evidence and corroborated by non-party witnesses, and, in 
some circumstances, physical evidence, including 
photographs. 
The trial court appropriately set aside a 
Quit-Claim deed which should have been destroyed, not 
wrongfully recorded. The effect of this ruling bolstered an 
earlier sanction against Appellant, from which Appellant 
abandoned any appeal. 
The trial court's division of assets is not only 
~uppnrted by its specific findings of fact, it is fair, and 
tile ruling truly endeavors to provide an equitable 
·•Ll1ustmerit of the parties' mutual economic resources. The 
award of attorney's fees after the testimony of two 
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attorneys was equitably allowed. As the trial court found, 
Respondent expended a large portion of these fees rPsisting 
Appellant's false allegations pertain1ny to thP validity ot 
a deed, or in pursuing discovery or defenclirilj prior specious 
appeals. Obtaining a simple appraisal of the marital home 
alone was, due to Appellant's contemptuous actions, a 
Herculean effort, contrary to the straightforward policies 
which fomented Utah's discovery rules. 
Appellant's belated motion to change venue is not 
well-taken. Not only was the same untimely, but it defied 
the scope of Title 30 U.C.A., as construed by this Court. 
The abortive appeal from the trial court's denial of 
Appellant's motion re venue did not divest the district 
court of jurisdiction under Utah law. This ruling conforms 
with both logic and the vast majority of precedents from 
sister states. 
While Appellant stresses his right to be present 
at trial, his motion to continue the setting hand-delivered 
on the date of trial did not assert any reasons for his 
being unable to attend the hearing. These arguments are 
newly raised on appeal. The trial court's refusal of this 
untimely motion is clearly not an abuse of discretion, when 
the trial had been previously continued and Respondent at 
great expense had subpoenaed two witnesses from Salt Lake 
City to attend the trial, which witnesses were already 
present in the courtroom. 
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Though Appellant's notice of appeal is dated April 
12, 1983, his fees were not received and the notice duly 
ti lecl by the Washington County Clerk until April 25, 1983. 
Under any theory arguing a stay of the time within which to 
perfect an appeal, Appellant's appeal is still untimely and 
this third appeal, as the two before it, should be rejected 
by this Court. To do otherwise would simply exacerbate an 
already egregiously dilatory proceeding in furtherance of 
Appellant's promise that this case would be the longest 
divorce in Utah history. 
Upon remand, Respondent should be entitled to 
costs and additional attorney's fees, if the award of the 
same be equitable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this;.2~ Y-/.._ day of April, 
1984. 
I hereby 
'- ' j ~_'--// A ~w&4z ~·~"~ / ~~~~/ f o~u~!SPOfld:nt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING !J.ft,\ .JI tf 1--
certify that on the Allllll, day of 11111• 
1984, I mailed two true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to D. Aron Stanton at 255 East 
400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage 
prepaid. 
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A P P E N D I X 
Exhibit P-4--Mr. Stanton's Letter of January 4, 1983 
Exhibit P-5--Mr. Thurber's Letter of January 11, 1983 
Exhibit P-6--Mr. Stanton's letter of January 13, 1983 
Affidavit of Anthony M. Thurber dated June 9, 1983 
0 DANIEL A. STANTCJN 
ArTQl'l"'I~" ""T LAW 
.. )1 SOUlH JC.)0 [.t.•1' •UIT( <110 
lfLE.PMON( 4 9011 3&4.DJ..if.Q 
Tuesday, Jce~.u.:.ry ~ 1983 
Antho~v Thurher / 
211 East Broad~ay, Suite 21S 
Salt La~e City, UT 84111 
Dear 'Ihurber: 
Re: Lord v Lord 
Civil Mo. 8042 
Fifth D1st. Ct., \.IA Co. 
Subpoena 5th Dist. Ct. 
Ref: Phone Conversation 
1/4/83 (Tues.) 010:30 a.Gl. 
'::his letter will serve as a memor.::indum of our phone 
conversation 1/4/83 (Tues.) @10:30 a.m. at which time you 
contacted my office and indicated that you had been 
sub?oenaed to testify fo~ the plaintiff (Rebecca Lord) in the 
above-referenced divorce action in the 5th District Court, 
washington County. 
Prior Reorese~tation (David G. Lord) 
You indicated, in the course of our conversation, that 
you had previously "drawn some papers" for l1r. Lord therefore 
were ~amiliar with the divorce proceedings between he and the 
plain:iff (Rebecca Lord). 
;1::. Lord i;octic,1tes that you drafted a "Proncrt'j 
Sett~c;:ient Agreement" in anticipation of a divorce hetween 
the parties. You furthermore have handled much ot: ;'ir. Lo::d's 
lc~a: work anJ thus are privy to most of his business and 
socL1l afLnrs. 
You .1c-l,1\01Jl1•d;',1~d t:h.11: t\r. Lrn-d die! in f.1c1: /',iV•' ;111 
auco:.1obilc co clw pL1intilf i.n cxch,111gc for z1 Quit Claim lkcd 
to the home. That tr;rnsaction is noh1 in dispute· ,d;J is to lie 
among other items the subject matter of your testimony. 
-
/ .. ''. Ltr. 1/4/83 Pcigc 2 
~:c'.:o=.<ltion has come to our attention that you 1-1ithin 
so~e social context had occassion to see Mr. Lor~'s wife 
while in Washington County. 
Subsequent to that occasion there was a phone 
co:cversation which Hr. Lord is prepared to testi~y co that 
after tal~ing to you Mrs. Lord called him and indicated that 
11 e'.rc:-: •;ou:- o~ ... -;-i a::::torney says you are fucking rr.e wit~ this 
J ~:"CC:-':'2'"'\ t 11 , 
We of course know not the nature of the conversation 
b<::twee~. you and !!rs. Lord however it would appear to be, or 
have been inconsistent with your ethical duty and 
responsibility under Canon 4 of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
You in the course of representing Mr. Lord obviously 
acc;uired privileged information and he reposed faith and 
confidence in you as his .attorney and relied upon the 
attorney-client privilege under Utah State Law. 
We suggest and advise that you inspect Canon 4 (copy 
enclosed) and a lawyers ethical duty to preserve confidences 
of a client. We direct your soecific attention to EC4-4; 
i:c:.-'i; EC4-6. He likewise direct your attention tot:Fle 
·0::-;;c::;ilinary rules DR4-101 and subsections contained therein. 
It would be our considered judgment that your testimonv 
in this case. ever. under subpoena, where it will be adverse 
to ~r. Lord's interest in this divorce·proceerling would be in 
violation of vour ethical duty under the canons and we 
accordingly a~vise you so you m~y t~ke whatever measures need 
to be done to protect yourself in this regards. 
Llr. 1/1,/SJ 
i,·;e suggc:...: :__·:1?_t )'Oil hct\'l' ,1 riul '/ u.;l.UL.:r t:~c Lir,_u:" '~-~-~'""'.(·_ 
to correspor.d in 1;riting uith the part': issuin1; L:C,~ ,;u'.:>;Jucr'.J 
or to formally file a ~lotion to Qu;ish Subpoeua stacin.; as t'.~e 
bas'..s ::.nd g-::-ou:',ds t':ierein that it would be a vioL1tio;1 of the 
atto::::-ney-client privilege. 
Since the subpoena requires your attendance J~nu~rv 18 
1933, we would apcreciate you advising us fo-::-thwitn or no: ' 
~r than Thu:-sr'.::iv, J;inuarv 13, 1983 ;is to your intei1'.:ior,s 
in regards to tnis matter so that we raay take appropriate 
steps to p-::-otect Xr. Lord's interest and vou likewise may 
take appropriate steps to protect you-::- interest. 
~;J;tJiL 
Attorney at Law 
cc: David G. Lord 
SLP/rds 
:·,_.._c: ;:..... Slu.c-:__on 
;... ~ to::-ncy at LU\-; 
.\)'; l!!()';Y i'l Tl!URIJEH 
ATTQnN(Y AT LAW 
~ALT 1-AHF CITY, u·r .... 11 84lU 
PHQNf.: (tJQ1) ~33•0181 
January 11, 1983 
~31 South 300 East Suite 410 
Salt La~e City, Utah 84111 
RE: Lord vs. Lord 
Dear Danie:C: 
This letter is written for the pLlrpose of correcting 
certain misstatements of fact appearing in your letter of 
January 4, 1983, concerning the above. 
As I indicated to you most clearly in that conversation, 
the ~uit claim deed in question was executed and delivered to 
David by Rebecca Lord in my presence on the express condition 
that it would be held unrecorded for a period of one year, and 
if the two remained together as husband and wife at the end of" 
that period of time the deed would be destroyed. The statement 
appearing on the first page of your letter ''you acknowledged 
that Mr. Lord did in fact give an automobile to the plaintiff 
in exchange for a quit claim deed to the home" is entirely 
untrue. There was a withess to the conversation of January 4, 
1983 who is prepared to confirm that fact if necessary. 
My involvement with the execution of the deed was only 
as a notary. The deed had been prepared previously. There was 
no attorney/client relationship existing between either party 
to the deed and myself at the time of its execution. Even had 
there been, no privilege would attach to statements made by 
either in the presence of each other, for the obvious reason 
that no confidentiality was involved. It is my understanding 
that you have previously argued that m~tter to Judge Burns, 
und been defeated. There is, in my view and in that of Judge 
Burns, no privilege attached to statements incident to execu-
tion of the deed in question. 
I have no p;1rticular <les.i re to br.come .invnl vr.cl wi l:h 
c.u.11c:c!l1C· c1 ::c.::., '""r 1 l.i.l l''·n!J1c1nco. llol.ll 1>;1vc dllcl lH:cky h;ivc in 
L::c [)d:.,l Liccc:n friccncls, although I've had no contact with either 
f 01- "''-"'"-' tirne. \·,'hat Dave is attempting to do with the deed 
· ..1:~,ich I r.otarizccl (ils il favor) is wrong. lie knows its wronCJ, I 
~-L:J'.1 l. ts 1·nons, and Becky knm~s its wrong. You know nothing 
~x~cJt what you are told. Whilt you hilve been told previously 
lS \./rU:l<J. 
-1-
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
~ 
I 1 1 .. r.Gt in the lc<J.st conccrneJ cJt,:._1~,~. 
co:-r?l.:1int reCjilrC::1ng ethical viola Lion:,. ·'"·;· ·~-· 
seriO'.Js:'...y ..::or'.s.:!..C.2:r :;·our· o'.:n CCJnJu\__'.~ 
p:-ol-.it.iition~ :..;:u __ ;-,st 1 nt imtJctti 
su~ornation of ~~~jury. 
'' ~ c • •I._•-' ~I._--' I -·- L .._,j_ .__ ~ c_! u.11U 
I have no anir1os1ty or favcirt1si<'1 LG\·,:ei.;::-,; l'.~t_f . .:::r o:: the 
?arties. I do know what happened and will testify if necessary 
I suggest that you settle the case upon the best ter~ 
you can obtain. 
Very truly yours, 
~~~·~ 
ANTHONY M. TnURDER 
AViT :cl 
-7- ... 
DANIEL A. STANTON 
AT"TQANCY 4.T LAW 
4.31 60UTH JOO (AliT. •UIT( 410 
&ALT LAK[ CITY. UTAH 8"111 
TELEPHONE 11501) l64·D.Z4Q 
-~'[·:~1·s..i,1:;, J~nuary 13, 1983 
I 
Ant:-:or,y Thurber 
A~torney at Law 
211 East Broadway, Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Lord v Lord 
Civil !fo. 8042 
5th Dist. Ct., \.JA Co. 
Prior Ref: DAS Ltr. 1/4/83 
Dear "Tony": 
We received your correspondence 1/11/83 and after 
talking to Dave wish to clarify some items, however still 
believe there is a problem as follows: 
Prior Representation 
We are advised that the issue of the Quit Claim Deed was 
in 1977 and there is a different recollection on the part of 
Dave as to the one (1) year expiration with regards to the 
Quit Claim Deed itself which is why the deed was recorded. 
We are likewise advised that subsequent to the entire 
matter, however that you in 1980 prepared a "Property 
Settlement Agreement" which was submitted to Rebecca and as a 
consequence thereof are intimately familiar with the problems 
of this divorce as well as the negotiations back and forth. 
:t is likewise our understanding that Dave is prepared 
to testify to the conversation that we make reference to in 
our letter of 1/4/83 and even the "unbecoming" lanp,uage used 
hy Rebecca in chc phone conversation. It seems more than a 
coinci clcncc rh.1t lc·,;o. 1:h,1n ,1 Wf'<'k .1ftf'r 1:ha1· phonf' 
<'•ll\V<'t"'.;;1ci.111, cli_v,11c,· 1~;1:; [ilc•cl, and i1· I:: i.ntl~rc::I ing t:h;i1· 
!Is. Lord talked extensively about a conversation that she had 
hctJ with you only a portion of which we memorialized in our 
prior letter to you. 
Ltr l/13/oJ 
Ou:- refcrc.::1ce t.1 the er-hied: l ci: ,:, : ) :·.~-)~- :_l-) • ..1L' 
cor.st:-L:.e.d .JS 11 ::..ntimidat1on tlf 1Jllnf' 1l' I cxlortlull cT'.l.~ 
subord1'.1ation of perjury" but is merely directed to vour 
atte'.1tion so that you may steer a "prudent course" as well as 
a "wi.cie path" around the canons to avoid any potentia:.. 
problems. 
We recognize that every lawyer wishes to avoid any 
e:hical breach if it is possible and likewise see~s to steer 
a "conservative course" with regards to any co;;duct that 
cou:d even be construed as such. Our point is that lav.n1ers 
as well as others should be as Ceasar's wife "not o'1ly free 
frorr, si'1, but free from all appearances of sin". 
Remed~al Conduct 
l<e again suggest to you that in light of your intimate 
involvement with the particulars of the private life of David 
Lord a'1d being fully aware of all negotiations in regards to 
a property settlement in this divorce, that your position not 
only was that of an advocate but also similar to a "priest" 
in t'.1at all "confessions" were made to you ir, the expectation 
that the attorney-client privilege applied. 
Based upon the best evidence that we have bee'1 able to 
obtain, and from what Dave tells us, and your letter making 
explanation of what in fact occurred, it remains our opinion 
that your involvement in this case was sufficient to the 
extent that you are precluded from testifying or you should 
at a minimum seek guidance from the court or have a judicial 
order to protect your interest should your judgment turn out 
to be in error. 
cc: D&vid G. Lord 
DAS/rds 
'i'Jlu:wsot1' fll'GHES & REBER 
Michael D. Hughes 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
148 Cast Tabernacle 
Sl. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 801/673-4892 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA SIMS LORD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID GEORGE LORD, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANTHONY 
THURBER 
No. 19167 
ANTHONY THURBER, being first duly sworn, hereby 
deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in 
the State of Utah and have practiced primarily in Salt Lake 
County for well over fifteen years. 
2. This affidavit is based upon my personal 
knowledge und information. 
3. I was the notary public on a deed attached 
hereto as Exhibit A, and privy to a conversation between the 
Respondent, Rebecca Sims Lord, and the Appellant, David 
George Lord, pertaining to the fact that such deed was not 
to be filed in the event the part ice; '.Jl ayc·d 1 '"Jct h<c.r for 
more than one year, which in fact the parties c:,d, 
4. I have reVJ<'Weri th(' ,-1: 1.lCCtVl t lJ1 Duruel A. 
Stanton, subscribed and sv1orn to on the 31st day uf May, 
1983, and filed with this Court. Paragraph 13 of Mr. 
Stanton's affidavit states the following: 
On January 18, 1983 witness for 
plaintiff-respondent, Anthony Thurber, Attorney at 
Law, called our office and asked about the appeal 
that was processed to the Supreme Court on the 
courts order denying defendant-appellants Motion 
for Change of Venue. Upon an affirmative answer 
from affiant that the District Court had processed 
the appeal, Anthony Thurber then stated that he 
would not appear for trial the following day 
because he felt the Trial Court did not have 
jurisdiction to continue with the Trial until the 
appeal was resolved by the Utah Supreme Court. 
5. The above Paragraph 13 of Mr. Stanton's 
affidavit is not true. 
6. On the 18th day of January, 1983, I spoke 
with Mr. Stanton over the telephone and indicated to him 
that I was under subpoena to appear in the District Court in 
and for Washington County in the case of Lord v. Lord, Civil 
No. 8042. I advised Mr. Stanton that as I was under 
subpoena I was going down to testify as to the invalidity of 
the deed attached hereto as Exhibit A, and I suggested to 
Mr. ~;tci11to11 th.-il he settle his lawsuit on the best Lerm11 
possible for his client. Mr. Stanton told me that he 
intended to appeul, and thilt hP, Mr. Stanton, was not qo1n<J 
to attend the trial. At no time did I tell Mr. ~tantvn th 0 ' 
I would not uppear for trial on the 19th clay of ,1,,nu.iry, alll1 
at· no line cJ1d I advise Mr. Stanton that I felt the trial 
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter set 
beforL' it on the 19th day of January. 
7. On the 19th day of January, under subpoena, I 
was sworn and, upon being ordered to testify by the Court, 
did so pursuant to the questioning of Michael D. Hughes, 
attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent herein, Rebecca 
Sims Lord. 
FURTHF.R AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this day of June, 1983. 
?ANTHONY THURBER 
Attorney at Law 
SUBSCRIBED AND 
of June, 1983. 
fv-
SWORN TO before me this //i day 
~/::cf(~'' 
NCT~RY PUBLIC ;// 
Residing at- 'r/ / --;,( ~ &c<>< ~ 
/ My Commission Expires: 
-"") !! -, ;_rLJ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the J-:J:L day of June, 
19 8 3. mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
forf'going l\FTJOAVIT OF ANTHONY THURBER to Attorney for 
L'cl'-'11Ll.111L, Uilnicl A. Stanton, at 4Jl South 300 East, Suite 
410, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid. 
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